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The object of this thesis is to present the 
principles of Casualty Air Evacuation in some of their adminis- 
trative, surgical, medical, and psychological aspects. 
An attempt will be trade to apply the knowledge gained in 
wax during the liberation of Europe, to the conditions of 
peace. The conclusions reached are based on my experience 
of over 20,000 casualties successfully evacuated by air. 
Rage 2. 
INTRODUCTION. 
EVACUATION OF CASUALTIES IN WAR. 
Before proceeding to the evacuation of casualties 
by any one specific method, it is essential to obtain a wide 
conception,by considering the general principles of the 
different methods and comparing their relative advantages and 
disadvantages. 
The evacuation of sick and wounded from any theatre 
of active warfare is naturally a major medical administrative 
problem, but in addition its tactical significance can not be 
overlooked. Reviewing the channels which exist for evacuation, 
it is found that they are:- 
(1). Road, by Motor Ambulance. 
(2). Rail, by Hospital Train. 
(3). Sea, by Hospital Ship. 
(4). Air, by Transport Aircraft. 
It will be observed that the expression 'Transport 
Aircraft' and not 'Hospital Aircraft' is used because in war 
the aircraft did not carry Red Cross markings, and were 
therefore legitimately subject to attack by hostile aircraft. 
Their primary functions were to carry airborne troops, to tow 
gliders, and to bring forward urgent freight and personnel. 
The transport of casualties on the return flight was of 
secondary importance, militarily, if not medically. Vhether 
special hospital aircraft protected by the Geneva Convention 
should have been provided, or will be provided in a future 
scheme, is a moot point and one with which many controversial 
features are associated ( 1 ). 
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Among the many factors to be considered in planning 
the evacuation of battle casualties, including sick, axe: - 
(1). The number of casualties expected from the military operation. 
(2). The evacuation routes readily available. 
(3). The.eographical nature of the country in which the 
carcpaign is being fought. 
(4). The prevailing climatic conditions likely to be encountered. 
(5). The facilities which are known to exist for the establishment, 
near to the fighting zone, of large medical units such as 
large General Hospitals with their highly specialised 
branches, such as Neurosurgical and Faciomaxillary Units. 
(6). The distance between the forward areas and the Base 
Hospital zones where full facilities exist for the 
complete treatment and rehabilitation of every case. 
(7). The relative time involved in transporting casualties 
to the base zones, with the most satisfactory results 
to themselves, by the different methods considered.. It 
must be continually .borne in mind that s'peedy evacuation 
of many cases tends to result in their becoming fit for 
duty in a much shorter time than would otherwise be 
possible. This is a feature of paramount importance 
where trained, highly- skilled manpower is at a premium. 
(5). The existence of evacuation ports, airfields, or 
locations on which it has been planned to establish 
airfields in captured territory,from which it will be 




(9). The availability of Hospital Ships or other suitable 
shipping, and the availability of sufficient and suit- 
able transport aircraft. 
(10). The best method of fully utilising the available medical 
resources by speedy distribution of casualties from busy 
forward zones to less busy rear areas. 
(11). The necessity of having in existence a reserve chain of 
evacuation in case of a partial or complete breakdown in 
the main chain due to a combination of unforeseen 
circumstances. 
Bearing these factors in mind, it is now possible to 
assess the values of the different methods - road, rail, sea, 
and air, and to arrive at certain fundamental conclusions. 
For the evacuation of casualties in the actual battle 
areas, motor transport, including if necessary tracked light 
armoured vehicles, is the only method excepting stretcher 
bearers. Evacuation alorg good roads over distances of up to 
50 miles in ambulance cars is satisfactory, if necessarily 
somewhat slow. Weather has no effect on its efficiency and 
staging is possible. 
For longer distances by land with a-good existing rail 
net -work, hospital trains are more economical in time and rn n 
power, and more comfortable than motor ambulances. The 
medical facilities are also much better. Staging is again 
possible and once more evacuation is unaffected by the vagaries 
of the weather. 
Evacuation by sea is influenced by port facilities, 
the availability of shipping, the weather, and the'duration of the 
voyage. Long sea voyages are slow, and there are more suitable 
settings 
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settings for operative surgery than on a hospital ship. This 
surgery is more likely to be necessary because of the duration 
of the voyage. For operated, fully treated, or convalescent 
cases it is ideal if the time factor is not important. 
The essentials of air evacuation are an airfield, a 
supply of suitable aircraft and satisfactory weather. Statin 
at airports en route, mainly in close proximity to general 
hospitals, is possible. 
ADVANTAGES OF AIR 'TP 4BSPO2T . 
Assuming that undoubted aerial supremacy has been secured,. 
air evacuation is the method of choice of all evacuation over 
l0 0 miles, especially if sea crossings have to be i..ade. The 
advantages to be derived from air transport are: - 
(1). The saving in general evacuation time and more especially 
the saving in transit time. (General evacuation time is 
considered to represent the number of hours from the time 
of injury or onset of illness to the time of arrival at 
a Base Hospital: transit time, the time taken in transit 
between one hospital arid another). 
(2) . The saving of man-power. 
(3) . The comparative ease of loading. 
(4) . The absence of repeated. handling. 
(5). The relative smoothness of air travel. 
(E :). The comparative safety of travel by such means. 
(7). The uplift in morale caused by the novelty, of air travel. 
(8). The fact that as a method of transportation it is is equally 
good for operated and non-operated surgery over journeys 
of up to 500 miles. 
(9)/ 
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(9). The probability of suitable staging being possible. 
(10). The economy of the load. 
(11). The assistance it gives by diminishing the shipping and 
transport necessary to carry stores and medical equipment 
forward, especially if the lines of communication are 
long. 
DISADVANTAGES OF AIR TEMPORT. 
The disadvantages undoubtedly are: - 
The weather, which is being partially overcome by the 
increasing use of Radar, but which still causes delays. 
The normal risks 'of air transport,and the fact that in 
the event of a forced landing away from an airfield 
medical attention may not readily be available, and it 
may be difficult to obtain sufficient road ambulances 
for the onward transmission of the casualties. 
The difficulty of using it as (i) the sole method of 
evacuation, or (ii) if aerial supremacy is not established. 
The selection of casualties in the event of the aircraft 
having to fly at altitudes of over 10,000 feet, or in 
very rouÿh weather. 
A BRIEF ELABORATION OF THE ADVANTAGES An DISADVANTAGES 
of EVACUATION BY AIR. 
Having outlined in general the advantages and 
disadvantages of air evacuation, a few specific examples will 
serve to clarify the reasons. 
The time - saving element is adequately illustrated 
in the case of A.B. who was injured in a motor accident. After 
orthopaedic/ 
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orthopaedic treatment under anaesthesia and the application 
of a plaster cast, he was evacuated from an airfield in Norciandy 
to a Base Hospital in England. 3e arrived in the latter hospital 
within 6 hours of his injury. This is by no means an isolated 
case and demonstrats the saving in general evacuation time. 
As an example of the saving in transit time, it is 
sufficient to state that many hundreds of casualties from 
Canadian Army Hospitals in Nijmegen were having d meal in 
England 42 hours later, while awaiting distribution to Base 
Hospitals in tie United Kingdom. ( 2 ) . The same journey 
by rail and sea would have taken 2 to 3 days and a large 
percentage of the casualties could not have stood,. the 
journey. 
Thousands of ill -patients leaving 
Nijmegen hospitals were in hospital in Bruges 22 hours later, 
before their next injections of Penicillin were due. This 
diminution in transit time is beneficial to all types of 
casualties, but particularly to the more serious cases. 
The saving of man-power would not appear obvious, 
but is nevertheless a fact. 
Clark R. L. Jr. and Shands A. E. Jr. (3 ) cuote the 
folloc-in information from the South West Pacific theatre:- 
fourteen large four -engine aircraft could transport 
the eouivalent to six 500 bed Hospital Ships. Travel time was 
cut from 24 days to 39 hours. Crew and medical personnel 
were reduced from 2136 for the ships to 336 for air transport . 
The 
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The loadin, of an aircraft is easy. The ambulance 
cars are driven to within three yards of the aircraft, and from 
then onwards the loading of-24 casualties by a party of 8 men 
can be completed in 10 minutes, including the necessary 
documentation. Handling of stretchers is reduced to a minimum, 
and disturbance of casualties is less likely to occur than by 
any other method. 
Air travel is normally smooth. There is usually 
little jolting on taxying, take -off, or landing. In the air, 
straps can be affixed to the stretchers to protect the patients 
in really rough weather, but it is extremely rarely that 
casualties can not be flown because of 'bumpy' weather. 
One hundred stretcher casualties questioned on 
whether there was more discomfort attached to one hour's air 
passage, or to a similar time spent in an ambulance, produced 
the following replies: - 
92 stated less discomfort by air. 
5 thought there was little difference. 
3 preferred the road journey. 
Two of the last 3 had been airsick! The hundred patients 
:hat. experienced different weather conditions and varying 
road surfaces, and included four different nationalities. 
It is interesting to note that Aird in a ionyman lillespie 
lecture sugaest'ed air transport as a solution to the long 
comfortless evacuation line in the desert. ( ) . 
On the safety of air transport, little need be 
written. Eighty -two thousand casualties evacuated from North 
West Europe to the United Kingdom from D -Day to VE -Day without 
one/ 
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One accident to a patient suggests that there is no safer way. 
Base or 'Blighty' has great significance to a battle 
casualty, and the novelty of getting there quickly, in comfort, 
by air has a beneficial effect on his morale. 
Patients who had undergone little or no operative 
'treatment, as were encountered in Normandy in June 1944, 
travelled just as well as the fully treated cases flown back to 
the United Kingdom later in the campaign, provided that they 
were kept free from pain. I cannot help feeling that the 
casualties evacuated at the same time in Landing Ship Tanks 
from the Normandy beaches were less fortunate, if only because 
of the length. of transit time. 
Staging of casualties was used to good effect in the 
early Spring of 1946 when casualties from Germany were flown to 
Brussels, staged, and then transferred to the United Kingdom.. 
It is practicable, and of value, when long flights are necessary 
with seriously ill patients. 
Several benefits accrue from what was described 
earlier as economy of load. The load (24 patients) is all 
that one doctor, nursing sister, or nursing orderly can 
contend with. It is neither too many, nor too few. Only if 
several seriously ill cases are being transported may it be 
too many. 
In the event of an emergency landing or diversion 
to another airfield, all B.A.P. Stations are capable of 
dealing with one load'and arranging their onward transmission. 
The size of the load ensures rapid handling and distribution 
of/ 
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general evacuation time in comparison with evacuation by 
land said sea. 
There are two important provisions: - 
The first is that the cases have been fully treated 
surgically and further operation is unlikely to be necessary 
at an early date. It is preferable that they remain in hospital 
until a few hours before their evacuation. 
The second is that the hospitals in cuestion are not 
compelled to evacuate to make way for other casualties. If this 
is not necessary, the casualties suffer little inconvenience 
from the delay, and in any case benefit from the shortened time 
'in transit. Delay is only detrimental to unoperated surgical 
cases such as ruiaht be evacuated early from a bridgehead. 
Weather unsuitable for flying and lasting over two days was 
infrequent in North West Europe ,from June, 1944, to .May, 19L15. 
The vagaries of weather which prohibit air evacuation 
are not therefore in any way detrimental to the treated patient, 
though they may well be to the untreated one. Where the 
weather nuestion becomes really important is when for long 
periods, due to climatic conditions, bad flying weather prevails. 
In such circumstances one can only hope to use air evacuation, 
when available, as a secondary method for high priority cases, 
or to ease the strain on the primary cannel. 
The increasing efficiency of blind- flying equipment 
must also be considered, and the day may not be far distant 
when it will be as justifiable to fly casualties in fo.r 
weather as in cloudless skies. 
The risk associated with flying in war is probably 
less for a casualty than an ordinary passenger, despite the 
absence 
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absence of Red Cross markings on the aircraft. Risks in war 
may be justified to deliver urgent passengers to their destination, 
but they could not be considered for casualties. Besides, the 
human element, so important in the causation of accidents, seems 
to be influenced beneficially when a crew is flying- wounded. 
Air evacuation can rarely be used as the söle chain 
of evacuation because of the possibility of a peak casualty 
period coincidin with a spell of bad weather. This applies 
more to forward areas than to base zones, and does not in any- 
way prohibit its use as the primary method from other than 
front -line medical units. Selection of casualties for air 
evacuation, as will be found later, does not constitute a 
major drawback, provided a doctor with a little experience is in 
charge. 
Balancing the pros and cons, there is no doubt that 
the advantages of air evacuation outweigh its disadvantages for 
all journeys of over 100 miles distance. 
THE HISTORY OF AIR EVACUA.TIO1 BEFOR3 THE WAR AND DURIYTá Tag 
YEARS 1939 to 1946. 
It is felt that without an historical outline of the 
birth and progress of air evacuation, misunderstandings of its- 
problems might arise in the mind of the reader. This seems to 
necessitate the inclusion of a section on 'The History of Air 
Evacuation'. 
To those with knowledge of aerial transportation it may 
seem extraneous; to those without, it should prove interesting 
and not without .,,edical significance. 
As/ 
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As it belongs to the realm of administrative medicine, 
a sphere of topical interest at present, it is written without 
apology. 
Prior to the beginning of the war in 1939, the Royal 
Air Force had flown casualties on a small scale in different theatres, 
and during the war a scheme was operated in England whereby casualties 
could be transported by air to different - hospitals. 
The figures of casualties evacuated during the year 1940 
were about 300, and for 1941 about 2,000. Evacuation on a large 
scale did not commence until the campaign of Libya and the Western 
Desert. In November and December, 1942, the numbers flown in that 
theatre were 5,000 to 6,000 per month. In the year 1943, 
28,000 casualties were air evacuated, mainly from the M.E.F. This 
year also saw the development of casualty air evacuation units and 
sections. 
In the following year, with the invasion of Europe, ever 
larger numbers were evacuated across the Channel from France. By 
the second week of August, 1944, the daily total of. casualties 
evacuated by air exceeded those evacuated by sea. After September 
until the end of the campaign, except for two short lapses in October 
and November, the numbers evacuated by air were persistently higher 
than those evacuated by sea. 
The break -out from the Normandy beach -head in August saw the 
institution of a forward shuttle service, This service resulted 
in 42,000 casualties having the benefit of speedy travel from 




Between June, 1944, and VE -Day, 32,000 casualties 
were evacuated to the United Kingdom from the Continent. 
In the year 1944, 300,000 casualties in all were 
flown by the Royal Air Force in all theatres. 
Sixty gercent of all British casualties in North West 
Europe were brought to the United Kingdom by air, but in the 
Far East,in forward áreas,_the figure reached almost 
100;Z. The chances 01 survival were naturall3, increased for 
tens of thousands of casualties. (5 ). 
THE DEVEL CPI.rENT OF '.IR EVACUATION IN EUGLAND AND NORTH 
WEST EUROPE FROM SVTR., 1943_, UNTIL D.It1Y, 1946. 
For simplicity, this development will be described 
under four general headings: - 
(1) . The formation of Air Evacuation Units in England and 
their functions, taxing into consideration the policy 
of the period Septr. 1943 to June, 1944. Mention 
will be made in this sub- section of the formation and 
broad general nrincinles involved in the establishment 
of reception units in the United Kingdom. 
(2). Air Evacuation from Normandy. 
(3). Air Evacuation throughout the remainder of the campaign and the 
institution of the Forward Shuttle Service. A broad 
outline of the period August, 1944, to May, 1945. 
Evacuation from the Continent after the conclusion 
of hostilities - ray, 1945, to May, 1946. 
(4). 
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(1) . Tilt, FOR ':4ATI ON OF C 4SUA.Ll'Y AIR EVACUATION UNI :S IN ENGLAND 
AND TH_IR FÜNC'IO'?S, TAKIN'u INTO CONSIDI,ñA'1IJPT THE l'ÜLICY 
OF THE PERIOP. SI!,YTE13BFR, 194.3, to JUNE, 1944. 
The planning and training of Units naturally began 
considerably before D -Day, and was based primarily on experience 
_rained in the Middle East. In September, 1943, the first Air 
Evacuation Units to be used for the despatching of casualties 
from North West Europe were formed in England. These 
Casualty Air .evacuation Units (C .A.E.U.) , as they were naaed, 
were four in number. The units were art of the medical 
organisation of the Second Tactical Air Force, and two were 
established in each of the Force's two Fighter Groups. 
These units consisted of a Medical Lfficer and 35 men. 
Sufficient transport and equipment was provided to make the 
unit completely mobile and self -supporting. The casualty 
holding capacity was 50 casualties. Medical equipment was 
comprehensive and included air ambulance panniers and oxygen 
annaratus . 
The Nursing Orderlies of these units had to attend a 
course on Air Ambulance duties, and were qualified as Air 
Ami,ulance Orderlies. All Unit personnel were ¿riven 
instruction on stretcher handling, aircraft loading, and 
elementary First Aid :On' other courses, which embraced theory 
and its practical application. Over 604 were qualified 
to drive heavy vehicles and had passed road tests. 
Considerable time was devoted to pitching and striking canvas 
quickly, as accommodation for casualties as well as Unit 
personnel was all tented. Exercises were organised which 
stressed 
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stressed initiative and ,nobility. The experience gained on 
such schemes proved extremely useful in the early phase of the 
invasion. 
In the beginning of February, 1941., the fur Units 
were transferred from Tactical Air Force control and incorporated 
into larger units known as Forard Staging Posts (F.S.°.), 
which were forming at this time in Transport Command. The main 
functions of these F.S.P's were to service and maintain 
transport aircraft, to receive and despatch passengers and 
freight, and. to despatch casualties. The medical staff was 
essentially the same as that of the original Air Evacuation 
Units, except for the addition of one Medical Officer and two 
Nursin Sisters. The previous scale of medical equipment for 
a C.A.E.U. had been so comprehensive that there was little 
necessity to add materially to it. 
At the same time as this was happening in Transport 
Command, one air evacuation unit had again been established 
in each of the 2nd T.A.F. Fighter Groups to replace the two 
which __ad been transferred and incorporated into the F.S.Pls. 
These new C.A.E.U's, however, were formed this time in such a way 
as to be divisable into two sections )r flights, each with 
a Medical Officer, 17 airmen, stores, transport, and being 
capable of working independently. 
Further intensive training in the field in the 
winter and sprine of 19Q4, and courses of instruction both by 
medical sections of F.S.Pls and the modified, newly formed 
C.A.E.0 +s of 2nd T.A.F. resulted in an adaptable and 
efficient casualty air evacuation despatch service being 
ready/ 
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ready for the invasion of Europe. 
At the same time in the South of England, casualty 
reception units were being set up at the three main terminal 
transport airfields. These units had facilities for holding 
and distributing 300 -400 casualties per day. The airfields 
were well situated in the centre of an area in which many 
hospitals were available, and in addition were near to an 
excellent rail -head from 7hich the lower oriority casualties 
could. be distributed by hospital trains when necessary. ( 2 ). 
An operating; theatre and a surgeon were available 
on the airfields to deal with all surgical emergencies. 
At one of these airfields there was a pool of 35 fully trained 
male and female air ambulance orderlies with experience of 
flying. These orderlies' work was to fly out with freight- 
carrying aircraft and to provide medical attention for 
casilPlties on the return flight. 
These units, which were of necessity large, had two 
medical officers, a surgeon, 6 - 8 nursing sisters, and about 
60 N.C.O's and other ranks originally. Their accommodation 
and equipment were amply sufficient. Some of the accommodation 
was originally tented, but later all casualty holding wards 
were hutted. 
The reception and distribution of casualties was 
riven a successful and comprehensive trial in pre-D -Day 
exercises: R.A.Y.C. Officers attended those exercises. The 
aircraft to be used were demonstrated and the air evacuation 
plan was outlined to them 
The/ 
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The original plan as it was conceived before D -Day 
was that in the initial stages of the carpaign the Dakota 
aircraft which had carried freight or personnel from the 
United Kingdom to North West Europe would be loaded with 
casualties on the return flight. At this stage freight - 
carrying aircraft would be landing on congested, highly 
op.r ational fighter strips, and would have to rendezvous with 
fighter escorts for the return journey, so that little time 
would be available for casualty loading. It was therefore 
exceedingly important that casualties should be awaiting 
the aircraft as they landed, and that trained loading parties 
should be standing by at readiness. 
The Dakota aircraft was capable of carrying a 
maximum of 24 casualties, of which not more than 18 could be 
stretcher cases. The 18 stretchers were carried 9 on each side 
of the aircraft in banks of 3, the lowest stretcher of each 
bank on the floor, and the other 2 on racks. A subsequent 
modification to the stretcher racks made it possible to 
carry 21 lying patients instead of the 18 mentioned 
previously, and 24 if they were on the American type 
litter. The total load was never supposed to exceed 24 
however. 
Obviously, at this period an atteapt would be 
necessary to mark and afford priority air travel to certain 
types of casualty when circumstances permitted, and sufficient 
aircraft were not available for the transportation of all the 
casualties. The priority grading mainly depended on the 
severity of the injuries and whether they would require 
subsequent/ 
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subsequent treatment at specialised Neuro- surgical, Orthopaedic, 
Chest or Peripheral -nerve Centres. 
It was considered that the despatching .Air Evacuation 
Unit would probably be static and that the 3fficer in Charge would 
be in communication with the hospitals in the vicinity, either 
by telephone, or despatch rider, so that casualties could be 
called forward to await the arrival of the aircraft. In 
actuality, it never happened.liie this. 
A pictorial representation is helpful in explaining 
the conceived organisation. (Diagram 1). 
After a bridgehead had been established and broken 
out of, it was anticipated that a forward shuttle service 
would commence. The Air Evacuation Units of the 2nd Tactical 
Air Force Fighter Groups were to be located on forward fighter 
airfields within 10 to 20 miles of the fighting troops.- The 
service was to operate between those forward airfields and 
Continental base airfields. 
Obsolescent Harrow aircraft, unarmed, twin engined, 
high winged monoplanes with fixed under -carriages were to be 
used for this task. These aircraft had the great advantage of 
only needing a short runway for take -off, and compared 
favourably in speed and endurance with the Dakotas already 
mentioned. They had been renamed Sparrows after conversion 
to hold ten stretcher cases and fourteen sitting, twentyfour 
sitting., or thirteen stretcher with no sitting. The most 
economical pay -load was, obviously, ten stretcher cases and 
fourteen sitting. 
The shuttle service was to be of short duration, up 
to one hour, and the aircraft were to carry a nursing orderly. 
Six/ 
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Six such aircraft were available, primarily for the transport 
of casualties on the forward shuttle service. At thebase 
Continental airfields, the F.S.P's would be situated and 
casualties staged by their medical sections before being trans - 
f erred to base hospitals in the vicinity by road, or to 
hospitals in England by Dakota aircraft, of which there would 
be a plentiful supply. 
Such then was the general plan for air evacuation 
when the invasion of Europe began. 
,Again s. -mictorial representation makes the situation 
more clear. (Diagram 2). 
(2). AIR EVACUATION FROM NORMANDY. 
In the early hours of the Normandy invasion, 30 
R.A.M.C. surgeons landed behind the invading forces. By 
excellent surgical technique they saved the lives of many of 
those who could not stand evacuation, and by rapid yet careful 
selection of cases they cleared the beaches of every casualty 
which had a reasonable chance of reaching England alive. The 
evacuation was carried out by amphibious vehicles to specially 
equipped L.S.T's until July 14th, when it was supplemented by 
air evacuation. 
No air evacuation unit was then present in the sector, 
and the medical officers of fighter wings, with scratch teams 
of stretcher bearers assisted by the aircrews of transport 
aircraft, loaded the Dakotas. In addition, a medical officer 
and such airmen as could be spared from a R.A.F. Mobile 
Field Hospital (M.P.H.) ( 6 ) which was in Normandy at the 
time, formed a mobile loading team. 
A/ 
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.A k.à..'.C. Officer, Down as a -:iedical Air Liaison Officer 
(M.A.L.O.) entered the picture about this time. This officer 
acted as a link between the Army medical formations and the 
R.A.F. evacuation units. He obtained daily figures to be 
evacuated from the various Armj units, Casualty Clearing 
Stations, and Forward Dressing Stations, informing them of the 
number of casualties to be sent, the time at which to send 
tern, and the location of th:. airfields from which they would 
be evacuated. T-ie estimated time of arrival (E.T.A.) of 
tile aircraft was known to him in advance, and it was his main 
responsibility to see that the casualties arrived before the 
aircraft. It was important that they should arrive before the 
aircraft so that they could be classified and marshalled into 
grouns of ambulances, each group with sufficient t3 load an 
aircraft. Loading parties were at readiness by their groups 
of ambulances, and as soon as the aircraft were off -loaded, 
casualty loading began speedily and in an orderly fashion. 
Time for loading was always short and if casualties arrived 
late, conditions tended to become difficult. 
Unfortunately, weather conditions and other factors 
often delayed the arrival of freighters, so casualties 
sometimes spent a fern hours waiting on adrfield.s. Arrangements 
were made for feeding them, giving plasma if required, and 
continuing the exhibition of routine sulpha dru s and morphine. 
Limited supplies of penicillin were available at this time, 
and this problem did not add itself to the iaa.ny others 
confronting the Medical Officer in Charge. 
The/ 
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The biggest disadvantage was the lack of holding 
accommodation for casualties, which resulted in the immobilisation 
of ambulances for long periods. These ambulances were often 
needed for other Purposes, and were not over plentiful in supply. 
The problem was never completely solved until thé arrival by 
air at the end of June of a F.S.P. medical section with adequate 
staff and tentage. An F.D.S. set up on an airfield as a 
stop -gap to hold casualties prior to this, was not of such great 
assistance as had been imagined because of the repeated changes 
in the scene of air evacuation from day to day. 
On D plus 9, one medical officer and 8 men, half of 
a Tactical Air Force Casualty Air Evacuation Unit, with one 
three -ton truck loaded to capacity, left the embarkation area 
for the Continent. Within two hours of leaving the transit 
camp in Normandy, two days later, a centre for casualty 
despatch was established on a Fighter airfield. Casualties 
began to arrive very soon after (within two hours). The 
tented accommodation at its disposal was insufficient to deal 
with the numbers involved, and casualties had to be held in 
ambulances. The very seriously ill patients were reLoved 
under canvas, so that they could be better observed and 
treated. Air evacuation took place from this airfield on 
several clays, but the weather it will be remembered, was 
extremely troublesome at this time and it did not reach the 
standard of efficiency that had been hoped for. 
On D plus 14 this centre was closed and the personnal 
joined another snll formation of roughly the same strength on 
another airfield. This latter formation actually consisted 
of one medical officer and 12 wen, mainly from the R.A.F. 
Hospital/ } Field Dressing Station. 
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Hospital mentioned previously. 
On this airfield, the efficiency of Chrysarobin in 
curing Psoriasis gained this unit the valuable assistance of 
a roman peasant boy. Later, with his friend, he became an 
unofficial member of the unit. They were excellent workers and 
proved of inestimable value in stretcher bearing. Their 
propensities for 'winning' the foodstuffs in short supply 
were astounding. Subsequently, though quite illegally, they saw 
the whole of the campaign through to the Luneburg Heath before 
being unofficially demobilised. 
As airfields were constructed, the Dakotas flew in the 
advanced parties of Fighter Wings, and the joint air evacuation 
unit mentioned above, of two medical officers and twenty -two 
men, arrived - previously to establish a centre from which to 
load aircraft. Almost daily movements through the coastal 
area, sometimes by night in clouds of artificial smoke, were 
trying, but the difficulties were overcome on most occasions 
by the unstinted co- operation of everyone concerned. 
About this time a hospital area with several General 
Hospitals functioning initially as 0.0.S's had been established. 
in Bayeux and casualties were able to be held there. 
As an illustration of the times and the improvised 
procedure used, it is of interest to describe one memorable 
day towards the very end of June. The Unit, which was 
resting at the time, moved at half an hour's notice to an 
airfield to which 40 Dakotas had been routed. Twenty were 
to arrive in the morning, and twenty in the afternoon. The 
time available for off -loading freight and on- loading 
casualties/ 
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casualties was one hour and twenty minutes in both cases, 
a fighter escort was being provided. 
as 
The casualties began to arrive just as the tentage had 
been erected and the cookhouse established. The casualties 
were checked, and two moribund head injuries removed; both 
subsequently died. As the aircraft taxied in, a list was 
prepared of the aircraft numbers. The ambulances, which had 
previously had their contents marked in chalk on the mudguard, 
were each directed in turn to a specific aircraft. The 
drivers were given a slip of paper with the aircraft number 
so that there could he no mistake. By this means a steady 
and controlled flow was maintained to each aircraft. -5y the 
time twenty ambulances had been directed to a different aircraft 
each, the off -loading of the first ambulance had been completed 
into the first aircraft and its loading teats were waiting for 
a further supply. The controller of the ambulances jotted down 
opposite the aircraft numbers on his sheet the number of 
casualties sent to each aircraft, so that he had a check 
throughout the whole loading procedure. This method was the 
only way in which the aircraft could be loaded in time. 
One member of the air evacuation unit supervised the loading 
party of each aircraft. These parties consisted of fitters, 
riggers,drivers, in fact anyone with time to spare was pressed 
into service, but the aircrews themselves gave invaluable 
assistance. Some pilots were warming up their starboard 
engines while casualties were being loaded on the port side. 
Seven hundred casualties sent by the various hospitals were all 
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The unit which had been brought in by those aircraft 
on this particular day was the advance section of a Forward 
Staging Post. The medical staff were iñcluded, 
with their 
stores and tentage for sixty casualties. The rear 
party with 
the heavy transport arrived almost at the same time. Within 
a couple of days another complete F.S.P. and the remaining 
part of the T.A.F. C.A.E.U. arrived. The combined medical 
staffs of both F.S.P's and the C.A.E.U., six doctors, four 
nursing sisters, and one hundred men established themselves 
temporarily on a Fighter airfield, 3.8 at Sommervieu near 
Bayeux, evacuating several hundred casualties. A week later 
another airfield at B. 14, Banville, had been completed to 
be used solely as a transport strip, and it was on this 
airfield that well organised air evacuation commenced by the 
combined unit already outlined. 
The airfield was within three miles of the Casualty 
Evacuation Post (C.E.F.) at Courselles, the sea evacuation 
reception centre, and within ten miles of the main hospital 
area at Bayeux. In addition there were about one thousand 
-Army beds within two miles of the airfield, at Reviers. 
Tented accommodation for holding up to one hundred and twenty 
casualties was erected near the airfield, and a road was bull- 
dozed by the R.E's from the holding section to the aircraft 
dispersals (Diagrams 3 and 4). 
The lay -out and general arrangements on this airfield 
were eminently satisfactory, and many thousands of casualties 
were evacuated from it without undue difficulty. Two Medical 
Air Liaison Officers, one Canadian and one R.A.M.C. were 
responsible for the arrangement of the delivery of casualties 
and 
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and their alternative disposal if air transport failed. 
A subsequent useful addition was a surgical team, consisting 
of a surgeon, anaesthetist, and theatre sister. 
The great advantage of this airfield 
was that if air 
transport was doubtful because 
of the weather, or re- allocation 
of aircraft, the casualties could be diverted 
to the sea 
route without loss of time. one particular 
day however, 
100 plus redundant casualties were transferred to the C.E.P. 
for evacuation by sea. Next morning they were returned to 
the airfield because the sea crossing was too rough. It 
was a relief to know that even the sea evacuation was made 
impossible by weather conditions.sometimes,when air 
evacuation was possible. Holding accommodation near the 
airfield also made it possible for casualties to be held 
overnight so that they could be loaded early in the morning. 
The disadvantage of sending casualties back to 
hospitals did not occur as it had done previously. The 
administrative turmoil caused by returning casualties to 
hospitals was great, because between the time of despatch to 
the airfield, the time spent waiting for an aircraft, and then 
the return journey, the hospital had as often as not filled up 
with fresh cases. To find accommodation for those who had 
been returned, and then to find doctors, was not always easy, 
and reclassification of the degree of severity of the 
casualties and operation was often necessary. At the air 
evacuation centre latterly,a tented theatre was erected and 




The only two other evacuation units rhich were 
involved in the bridgehead were the Canadian C.A.E.U. from 2nd 
T.A.F. and another F.S.P. medical section. The Canadian unit 
never joined the large organisation already described, but 
the other F.S.P. medical section did later. The Canadians 
did a little evacuation from Normandy, but really only entered . 
the picture in August during the advance through France and 
Belgium. 
The disbandment of the air evacuation units of 
2nd T.A.F., and their absorption into an R.A.F. or R.C.A.F. 
M bile Field Hospital respectively, occurred at the end of the 
bridgehead phase. Their new designation was Light Casualty 
Air Evacuation Section (L.C.A.E.S.). 
The units, though not retaining their separate 
entities, continued to be used for air evacuation purposes, as 
will be seen later. The step was mainly taken to solve 
administrative problems. The Casualty Air Evacuation Sections 
of Mobile Field Hospitals were rarely with their ) axent units 
during the rest of the campaign, being detached to Fighter 
Wings at varying distances from the M.F.H*s and working 
independently on air evacuation duties. 
The original plan conceived in anticipation of D -Day, 
as so often happens, worked out nearly but not quite as expected. 
It said a great deal for the administrative authorities that so 
efficient a scheme was evolved in the unanticipated conditions 
which did arise, not faultless perhaps but excellent 
nevertheless. 
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(3). AIñ EVACUATION THROUGHOUT THE 42,: ú'_IT_..iIR OF 
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After eight weeks the bridgehead phase concluded, 
and the 
2nd British Army 'swanned' across the Seine 
and on to.Brussels, 
with the Canadians following the coastline. 
After the British Army moved out of the bridgehead, 
airfields were captured or..constructed for the Fighter 1,ings 
just behind the,advancing troops. It was often on these 
airfields that the light casualty air evacuation sections of 
the B.A.F. :6obile Field Hospitals - Canadian and British - 
established themselves, and initiated the forward shuttle service 
as originally planned and outlined in a previous section. In 
addition, evacuation to the United Kingdom was carried out direct. 
The Canadian L.C.A.E.S. covered the forward areas in 
which the 2nd Army were fighting, and the British one the 
coastal belt in which the 1st Canadian Arrgv was involved. 
Moves were frequent as the advance was fast, but both the 
Canadian and British Units operated in three or four centres 
each before Eindhoven and Antwerp respectively were reached. 
The two flights of the Canadian unit worked together and never 
as two separate flights throughout the campaign. The British 
unit, however, moved in two flights, leap -frogging each other, 
and although operating together for short periods, mainly 
set up as two separate centres. The reason for this was 
that the charaeter of the fighting originally necessitated 
evacuation from two centres at once. 
The/ 
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The best example of this is as follows:- 
The Canadian advance along the coast was held up by 
Le Havre, Ostend, Calais, Boulone, and Dunkerque. It was 
considered necessary to'have an Air Evacuation Centre at St.Omer. 
This town was more or less central for the three latter, where. 
there was a Canadian General Hospital and a mobile Neuro- surgical 
and ?'axilla- facial Unit. Sea evacuation was at Dieppe, which 
involved a long road journey. 
One flight established itself on a captured German 
airfield outside St. Omer and evacuated casualties direct to 
England or to the Bayeux base hospital zone. Meantime, the other 
flight was in Antwerp, evacuating casualties from there. 
Eventually in September, the Bayeux hospital area began to shut 
down, and British hospitals opened up in Brussels and its 
environs, which became the hospital area. The Canadian 
hospitals were mainly in North Belgium - Bruces, Ooste 
Dunkerque, etc. The main points from which air evacuation 
was taking place at this time were Eindhoven, Brussels and. 
Antwerp, with subsidiary small -scale scattered evacuation 
from places like St. Omer and Diest. The Eindhoven service 
was partly to the United Kingdom and 'partly to Brussels, and 
the Antwerp and. Brussels services were direct to the United 
Kingdom as well as to Bayeux originally. 
The air evacuation unit at Brussels was a R.A.F. 
Mobile Field Hospital, which was temporarily converted for the 
purpose and worked very well there before resuming its normal 
duties. Prior to its arrival an Army F.D.S. had been used 
in a holding capacity, with a F.S.P. medical staff to control 
the loading. 
at/ 
Holding facilities were available in a F.D.S. 
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at Eindhoven, and by a H.A.F. F.S.P. at Antwerp. 
To quote from Porritt et. al ( 7 ):- 
"In this phase, air evacuation really carne into its 
"own, and without it the evacuation of casualties back over 
"the war - scarred congested roads to Normandy would have been 
"virtually impossible. As it was, the R.A.F., with the able 
"guidance of Air Commodore Murphy and Group Captain Bruce 
"Harvey, appeared with a Dakota and almost magical regularity 
"on what seemed quite impossible fields almost alongside 
"C.C.S's and Surgical Centres. Ve, as surgeons, then and on 
"many subsequent occasions had every reason to be grateful to 
"the R.A.F. - both its medical staff and its aircrews - for 
"their wholehearted co- operation ". 
Air evacuation had proved itself to be a necessity of 
mobile warfare. 
In November, a large unit was formed in Brussels 
with eight doctors and eight sisters and complete mobile 
equipment. It was divisible into three flights, H.Q.flight 
and A and B flights, which were each capable of holding up to 
100 casualties per day, with full medical facilities. Each 
flight was able to handle comfortably 200 casualties in and 
out per day. Subsequent air evacuation on any large scale 
was carried out by one of these flights, working often well 
forward. The H.Q. flight remained at Brussels until the end 
of the wax to receive casualties for the base hospital area, 
also evacuating others to England. 
Where air evacuation was necessary on a smaller scale, 
the Canadian or British Light Casualty Air Evacuation Sections 
were utilised, but sometimes found themselves with as many to 
handle/ 
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handle as the larger flights of the C.A.E.U. They, however, 
were nearly always concerned with evacuation out, and had no 
casualties beine shuttled in to them. 
In the winter, the Canadians cleared up the coast, 
leaving only the Czech Independent Armoured Brigade Group 
encircling the last remaining coastal strongpoint, Dunkirk. 
Walcheren had been taken in a fierce amphibious operation. 
Antwerp became the port of the B.L.A., despite the attention 
it received from the V weapons. Nijmegen was solidly in our 
hands, and the line was firm up to the Meuse. During the 
whole of this phase air evacuation had played its part in 
solving the problem of the disposal of the wounded - a 
problem of tactical as well as administrative importance. 
January the first of 1945 was a day of unhappy memory 
to those of us who had grown attached to the Sparrow forward 
shuttle aircraft. The Luftwaffe, staging their last desperate 
all -out attack on British airfields, destroyed several of 
them parked on Brussels Airport. They were quickly replaced 
by Dakotas, but the familiar name ofthe Sparrow flight 
fortunately persisted. 
February 8th saw the Canadians driving through the 
Siegfried line in filthy weather with shocking road conditions. 
Casualties were heavy and air evacuation was used to good effect. 
One specific instance of this was the evacuation of casualties 
from the Canadian mobile neuro- surgical unit located at this 
time near s'Hertogenbosch. One daily aircraft to the United 
Kingdom from a nearby airfield transported on an average 10 
head injuried per day during 3 to 4 weeks. 
In/ 
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In March, Goch (B. 100) , the first air evacuation 
centre in Germany, came into action. Following the airborne 
crossing of the Rhine and the swift advance of our forces across 
the Westphalian plain, a more forward centre opened on the bomb - 
scarred airfield at Rheine. 
In April, with North Holland still holding out and 
Arnhem not yet in Allied hands, Nijmegen was being used for 
fairly large scale evacuation to base at Bruges and direct to 
England. One medical officer and 20 men there evacuated 
about 4,000 casualties in that month, 2,200 of them passing 
through in one week and 450 being the record day. 
The final centre at Celle, highly organised in captured 
airfield buildings, functioned from within a day of the capture 
of the town until after VE -Day. Evacuation was to base at 
Brussels, as well as to the United Kingdom. When this day 
arrived, the whole air evacuation system was working extremely 
efficiently. The only main difference from the original 
conception of shuttle evacuation was that air evacuation took 
place directly to the United Kingdom as well as to base, 
even from forward airfields. (Diagram 5). 
(4) . EVACUATION FROM THE CONTINENT AFTER THE CONCLUSION 
OF HOSTILITIES - MAY 1945 to MAY 1946. 
During this period casualty schedules were run as 
often a week as necessary to evacuate the casualties. This was 
usually every other day, and the aircraft schedule was laid 
down in advance. Evacuation was from six centres in Germany 
and 
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and one in Brussels. The signals facilities improved with 
the diminution of signals traffic. Delays were unusual and 
evacuation entered a static phase which naturally resulted in 
good holding accommodation and surgical facilities being 
available. 
Very few casualties, .iowever, really needed evacuation 
by air, and the service terminated in May, 1946. Since then 
aircraft have been available for priority casualties, heads, 
facial -maxillary cases, etc., and the service functions 
smoothly. 
SURGICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF AIR EVACUATION. 
Before approaching the surgical aspects of air 
evacuation, it is wise to pause for a moment to consider briefly 
the surgery of the campaign in North West Europe. 
The following facts extracted from the article "B.L.A. 
Surgery" by Porritt et al ( 7_) are illuminating. 
Surgeons of the B.L.A. achieved remarkable feats 
during the eleven months of the campaign. Achievements in 
figures are quoted. Four hundred and six thousand admissions 
were made to medical wards, of which 258,000 (64 %) were treated 
in the theatre, and 148,000 (36 %) transferred to the United 
Kingdom. More than 50% of the latter travelled by air. 
One hundred and eighty -one thousand (45%) of the total 
admissions were battle casualties, of which 50,000 (28 %) received 
their surgical treatment in the forward areas. Two- thirds of 
these were serious major wounds. Of the total battle casualties, 
39% were evacuated to the United Kingdom, and 61% were treated 
in B.L.A. Only 6.7% died of wounds. 
The/ 
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The figures of the quantity of casualties qualified 
by the figures of the recovery rate (94%), demonstrating the 
quality of the surgery, illustrate the skill of the 170 
surgeons involved.. 
Generally speaking, casualties which require active 
surgical interference benefit more than any other type from 
rapid and early evacuation to a Burgical Centre. The 
forward Surgical Centres in B.L.A. usually consisted of 
2 C.C.S's, 2 F.S.U's, and 1 F.T.U. Their aim was to provide 
for as many casualties as possible,the surgical attention 
which they required. They were not, however, always able to 
deal operatively with the large number of casualties reaching 
them, even after screening at a F.D.S. further forward had 
removed the sick, the minor wounded and the battle exhaustions. 
Only by careful selection of casualties whose operations could 
be dela,.ed, and by speedy evacuation of those selected was it 
possible in such circumstances to do the greatest good 
to the greatest number. Evacuation by air in the Normandy 
days provided one satisfactory answer to this problem. 
The old established maxim that early definitive 
surgery is of paramount importance in the elimination of 
infection and the promotion of successful healing remains 
unaltered, despite the advance in surgical and medical technique, 
transfusion, sulpha drugs and penicillin therapy. 
There are certain types of surgical casualties which 
require additional precautions during transit by air, and 
consideration of these types is essential before generalising 
on/ 
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on their suitability or unsuitability for aerial transportation. 
These specific types will be dealt with individually in the 
section which follows. Physiological, pathological, pharmacol- 
ogical, and therapeutic consideration of each type will be 
outlined and basic conclusions reached on their suitability 
for flight. 
II?JU .IES TO TEE NERVOUS 31STZ+'id. 
(1). Cranial Injuries. 
By common agreement, injuries to the nervous system 
are most beneficially treated at a neuro - surgical centre (8 ), 
(9 ), (10), (11)(12).The meticulous care required in the 
invsti;ation of such cases, the highly specialised surgery 
involved, and the post- operative and rehabilitatory after- 
treatment so essential to the attainment of the hest results 
can only be achieved at such a centre. Terian's general 
fatality rate of 8 in penetrating; injuries of the brain during 
the Russian offensive of the summer and autumn of 1943 
illustrates the importance of only trained neuro -sureons 
operating on cranial injuries (13). The general concensus of 
opinion seems to be that operation before the onset of 
infection is preferable, (14), (15 ), and that speed in transit 
to neuro- :Surgical centres is desirable. The importance of 
operation within three days or less is stressed by most neuro- 
surgeons (10), (ló ) . 
A comparison of Ascroft's cases with those of Eden 
(14), (17), reveals the importance of early surgery with/ 
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with renard to the subsequent incidence of post -Operative 
infection. 
In the case of the former neuro- surgeon, the patients 
were received at base at intervals between a few hours to seven 
days after injury. Three- fifths of the cases had been operated 
on in forward areas, and only one -quarter received their primary 
operation at a neuro- surgical unit; 25% of these cases subsequently 
developed brain abscess. 
Sixty -five percent of Eden's cases were operated on 
within 24 hours of wounding, and his incidence of ibf ection, 
post -operatively, was 13 out of 102, only one of which 13 was 
a brain abscess. 
In the war in Europe, 2 mobile neuro- surgical units 
functioned (7), often in the forward. areas attached usually to 
mobile General Hòspitals. - The 2nd British Army and the 
1st Canadian Army each had a mobile unit of this nature. Extra 
neuro- surgical teams were available at other hospitals by 
utilising specialists in ordinary hospital appointments. During 
the peaTr casualty periods of the major actions, the neuro- surgical 
potential was often insufficient to cope with all the casualties 
requiring surgery. It was at such times that air evacuation 
of treated and untreated cases to held injuries centres in 
England was of particular assistance. Evacuation by air from 
areas in which no neuro- surgical unit existed, either to the 
nearest mobile continental neuro -surgical unit or preferably 
to England, resulted in considerable saving of life. Aerial 
transport of the cranial injury applied as beneficially 
to the cases treated at the mobile neuro- surgical unit as to 
the selected untreated case which was being transferred to 
the 
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the United Kingdom by them because of their inability to keep 
upwith the required surgery during a battle. Both types 
tolerate transport well ( 9).(12)'(17). This has been droved times 
without number in absolute contradiction to .a German 
allegation that no head injury should be moved within three 
weeks of primary operation (18). As.a generalisation, the 
closed head can be evacuated without added risk (19). 
Both treated and untreated cranial injuries were 
evacuated in large numbers from North West Europe. The treated 
cases were usually moved within two to three days of operation, 
and the untr gated cases as soon. as their general condition 
allowed and an aircraft was available. The fact that the 
majority of these treated cases travelled by air within three 
days of operation is of significance. Eden (14) states that 
patients making satisfactory progress can safely be evacuated 
by air about the second or third day after operation. 
The evidence of Gorodetsky (20) suggests that 
evacuation to base areas, even by air, of operated cases a week 
after operation may be detrimental to their condition. Jolting 
of the brain tissues is given as a possible explanation, but I- 
cannot, in the light of my experience, cite evidence in support 
or condemnation of this statement. 
The percentage of all cranial injuries evacuated 
during general evacuation was 5% to 6% of all casualties, yet 
during one busy phase of selective air evacuation in February/ 
March, 1945, the percentage rose to 50%. The interpretation 
of this fact can only be that the Canadian neuro- surgeons 
involved/ 
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involved at this time considered evacuation by air to be the 
most satisfactory method of disposal to base of their cases, 
whether treated or untreated (21). This confirmed the 
opinion of British neuro- surgeons with whom I came in contact 
previously as well as subsequently. 
The American authors Gaynor and Gurwitz (22) agree 
with the observation of British surgeons that patients with 
head injuries travel well and do so better before than after 
operation. They opine that unless adequate neuro -surgical 
facilities are available, operation should not be undertaken, 
but point out on the other hand that transportation to base 
may involve dangerous delay. Ascroft(i6) is in agreement 
with them regarding the first part of their opinion and cites 
over 100 cases which travelled by air. 
Air evacuation would seem to be the answer for the 
rapid evacuation which is deemed advisable in such circumstances. 
The opinion of one Russian neuro- surgeon (23) at least was that 
the more quickly a soldier with a head injury is evacuated into 
a neuro -surgical. hospital the better, and that aerial transportation 
should be used whenever possible. Korniansky, the surgeon 
in question, suggests that after radical operation, the wounded 
should be moved to a base hospital on the day of operation if 
practicable and if their general condition permits, as subsequent 
development of oedema of the brain makes them unsuitable for 
transport. This point is mentioned in passing because 
of its relation to what *has previously been written. 
The 
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The use of the small German Feisler Storch aircraft 
for evacuation of such casualties is advocated by &eingerber (24 ), 
who comments on the unfortunate absence of them on the Russian 
front. His affirmation that it would be foolish to trephine 
a skull if an aircraft to a special hospital were available 
meets with Allied approval. 
A dissenting voice, that of Elansky (25), does not 
support the generally accepted theory that in cranial wounds 
pre- operative evacuation is preferable to post -o-;erative 
evacuation. He proceeds to aver that cranial wounds withstand 
evacuation badly whether before or after operation. Although 
aerial transport is not specifically mentioned, I have no 
hesitation in stating that such is not the experience of any 
medical officer connected with the evacuation of Pritish and 
Canadian casualties from North West Europe. Although the only 
-:asualty which died in the air was a cranial injury on his way 
from the Continent to England, I personally have seen no evidence 
to support Elansky's thesis. 
Although physiological proof can be obtained that 
variations occur in the pressure of the cerebo - spinal fluid 
under reduced oxygen tensions and reduced pressures, those 
variations are not of sufficient magnitude for important clinical 
significance to be attached to them. It is safe to state 
that no significant increase in intra- cranial pressure will 
arise in casualties who are being evacuated by air if anoxia is 
avoided (26). 
Variations in intra - cranial pressure at decreased 
atmospheric pressure in a human subject with a large cranial 
defect/ 
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c.efect have been recorded b:- Peterson, 
Kent and Cone (27). They 
assume that casualties suffering from 
head injuries should 
tolerate air transportation without damage.- The 
speeds and 
manoeuvrability of the types of aircraft in 
which casualties 
were evacuated eliminated the danger of damacing effects 
to 
head injuries resulting from the effects of centrifugal 
force 
or changes in velocity. 
The main pharmacological interest associated 
with the transit of head injuries centres around sedation. 
The restlessness of patients with acute head injuries must be 
effectively controlled without, if possible, causing ill effects, 
but sedatives must be used with caution. In severe head 
injuries morphine is found to çause a consistent and considerable 
rise in the pressure of the cerebro- spinal fluid, usually 
accompanied by a slowing of respiration and even cyanosis (28). 
It is felt by many neuro- surgeons that this drug should be 
avoided except when it is necessary to relieve pain. 
The exhibition of intramuscular barbiturates, 
although causing none of the ill- effects mentioned above, appears 
to have no appreciable sedative effect. Chloral- bromide is 
similarly of comparatively little use as a sedative if cranial 
trauma exists. A combination of codeine grs 12 intramuscularly 
and 3 grs of nembutal by mouth procured excellent sedative effects 
in 85% of a small series of cases quoted by Gurdjian and Webster (29) 
. 
Sleep occurred within ten minutes of administration of the drugs 
and only one of the 14 cases showed a rise of any significance 
in the cerebro- spinal fluid. pressure. 
Most/ 
Page 40. 
Most cranial injuries travelling from North West 
Europe had been well sedated before leaving neuro- surÿical 
units, ard others were unconscious without being restless. 
The question of further transit sedation arose in less than 5% 
of all the cases evacuated. When it did arise, I, rightly or 
wrongly, did not hesitate to use a quarter grain of morphia 
parenterally. There were no obvious ill- effects in any of 
the cases to which morphine was administered during transit, 
and I know from personal experience that several of the 
Canadian neuro- surgeons and physicians whom I encountered, had 
no rooted objection to its use(17)Nembutal alone was used in some 
cases with somewhat disappointing results, and the difficulty of 
administering rectal paraldehyde in crowded marquees with . 
minimal facilities precluded the use of what is most probably 
one of the best drugs. in such cases. 
Another controversial feature of transit therapeutics 
in cranio- cerebral injuries arises from the consideration of the 
fluid intake. As a general rule there would appear to be no 
necessity for the institution of treatment by hypertonie fluids 
during transit, especially in closed heads (19). In fact, the 
reverse would appear to be the case, and it seems important in 
semicomatose and comatose patients particularly to supply fluid 
of a nutritive value, such a.s intravenous glucose saline 
by slow drip. Dehydration would appear to be unnecessary 
in the majority of closed cranial injuries (30). The 
withholding of fluids from a conscious casualty certainly does not 
appear to be justified. 
A].1 
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All casualties air evacuated travelled with their 
heads towards the direction of fliaht. Other positions were not 
tried, but the one mentioned above seems eminently satisfactory. 
In cranial injuries uncomplicated by other wounds, a neutral 
position for the head seems to be the most satisfactory one 
durin_ transit. Eighteen penetrating wounds of the cranium 
with other corapTications, such as penetrating chests, were not 
found to suffer during evacuation from travelling with back 
rests and their heads raised. The position for the casualties 
head is a matter for individual consideration where complicating 
features exist, and would seem most beneficially solved by the 
exercise of careful clinical judgment. The head low position, 
in my opinion, is seldom justified during the aerial transportation 
of cranio- cerebral injuries. No benefit is derived from the 
immobilisation of the casualty on the stretcher by straps.or 
sheets during transit (13) unless the weather becomes so rough 
that it is obila necessary. 
Therapy by penicillin and sulpha drugs, post -operatively 
or pre -operatively, was maintained in all penetrating wounds of 
the head during transit. The decision as to the necessity of 
such treatment was ,primarily that of the neuro- surgeon, and 
air evacuation centres only continued the already initiated 
therapy. No cases of local penicillin therapy by a tube into, 
the wound were seen by me. 
Dressings applied to the -patient before leaving the 
hospital fortunately rarely required attention except in 
occasional restless patients. No alteration in tie incidence 
of/ 
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of airsickness was noted in comparison with the other types 
of eases evacuated. In unconscious patients the danger of 
bec: -sores and burns from hot water bottles must be remembered. 
From my own experience of just under 500 cases of head 
injuries of all types, seen before and during transit by air, I 
reached the conclusion that,granted reasonable air speeds, and 
at altitudes of 1,000 to 6,000 feet, the transport by air of 
cranial injuries does not materially alter the -patient's chance 
of recovery. 
SUM?:'LARY JF CRAIJIAL I'?J'URILS. 
-(1). Head injuries, treated or untreated, travel very well by air 
at altitudes up to 6,000 feet. 
(2). The risks attended by aerial transportation of such cases.are 
less than by. other means because of the gross reduction in 
transit time and the relative absence of disturbance. 
(3). The variations in cerebrospinal pressure occurring through 
reduction of atmospheric pressure and oxygen tension are of 
no clinical significance. 
(4). Morphine as an analgesic and sedative can be used as safely 
darin2.the transit of cranial injuries by air as at ground levels. 
Paraldehyde rectally is most satisfactory. 
(5). Zarenteral administration of penicillin should be maintained 
dúring transit.. 
(6). The position. of the head should be neutral if not contraindicated 
by other injuries and towards the direction of flight. 
(7). The withholding of fluids does not generally constitute any 
advantage. 
(8). Cranial injuries are no more affected by air -sickness than other 
types of injury. 
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(2). SPINAL INJURIES. 
Spinal injuries formed less than 1% of the wounded 
evacuated by air from North West Europe to England. In a general. 
way such injuries fall into two cateao ies, the first without 
affection of the spinal cord, and the second with paraplegia. 
On the latter type supra -pubic cystotomy had almost always been 
carried out. Debenharn and Kerr (31) aver that if supra -pubic 
cystotomy is provided to ensure satisfactory urination, and 
precautions are taken against the occurrence of bed sores, spines 
travel well in the normal casualty stream. To this one might 
add breathing exercises if circumstances permit. 
In essence, transit management of spinal cases is 
identical with their management in hospital. A stretcher 
is not comfortable for a healthy individual to sleep on, so 
it is even less so for a soldier who has been wounded. It can 
even be harmful to his condition if he is unable to move when 
he feels uncomfortable. Pressure sores and complications 
may develop to prejudice his general condition. Massive 
collapse of the lung is more common, it would appear, in battle 
casualties than in civilian accidents (32). To prevent such 
complications, precautions must be taken during the transit of 
spinal cases. 
The documents of patients who are unable to move 
themselves have usually been marked 'Alter position during 
transit'. This must be carried out regularly. If a case has 
been overlooked, the air evacuation medical officer should see 
that the patient's card is marked to this effect. The 
nursing 
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nursing orderly on the aircraft should be informed of all inert 
patients and given instructions to alter their position from 
time to time. In the supervision of loading an aircraft, the 
medical officer should see that such cases are put in the middle 
tier of the stretcher racks, as it is easier for the orderly 
to move the patient if he is in this berth . Such alterations 
in position, as well as tending to prevent bed sores, often 
cause an alteration of breathing and stimulate coughing, which 
by clearing the respiratory tree of mucus, diminishes the risk 
of pulmonary complications. Care of ,pressure points is of 
paramount importance, either by bandaging over large çuantities 
of wool or by the use of an air ring in the case df the sacrum. 
In paraplegics with supra -pubic cy, stotorgy, care must 
be taken to avoid disturbance of the supra -pubic catheter. 
Then or if a case is encountered before treatment by supra - 
pubic,cystotomy, it.is inadvisable to resort to catheterisation 
unless absolutely unavoidable because of the almost certain 
introduction of infection (33) 
Flying presents a very satisfactory method of 
transportation for the treated spinal case. It avoids jolting 
and involves'a relatively short transit time. This latter, 
per se, reduces the liability to bed sores should the patient 
be overlooked during transit, as can quite easily happen in 
busy phases. It can be stated without fear of contradiction 
that spinal injuries with or without cord damage travel well 
by air and should be given a high- priority grading. 
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ad;T:'LARY OP SPINAL, INJURIES 
(1). Spinal injuries with or without paraplegia travel well 
by air. 
(2). The reduction in transit time diminishes the risk of 
bed sores and massive collapse of the lung. 
(3). Precautions must be taken to alter the patient's 
position at least every two hours and preferably hourly. 
Particular attention must be paid to the pressure points. 
(4). All nursing orderlies in charge of aircraft should be 
briefed regarding alteration of ,position and the 
patients' documents irked '.ALTER POSITION IN TRANSIT'. 
(5). Care must be taken during loading of the supra -pubic 
catheter in paraplegics. 
( ). If practicable, breathing exercises should be continued 
while awaiting transit and curing flight. 
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(3). PERIPHERAL NERVE INJURIES. 
A comparison of the organisations for the treatment 
of such cases in Britain and America can be found in an article 
by Naffziger (34). He is of the opinion that more specialised 
care is given to British than to American Forces, despite the 
fact that Great Britain has proportionately fewer specialists 
and physicians to their popúlation. This end, he stresses, 
is accomplished by assembling the patients at fewer centres 
where senior civilian surgeons can give the assistance of 
their experience and knowledge to less experienced members 
of the team. He favours the British practice of locating 
such centrés with or near to medical schools. 
Again, one can rightly infer that specialised 
treatment is best obtained at specialised centres. Obviously, 
apart from the initial essential surgery, the sooner a ;patient 
reaches such a centre the better. The field is no place for 
time -consuming operations, nor are they practicable in the rush 
of war surgery. 
It is of interest that another article on the subject 
of peripheral nerve injuries in the European theatre of 
operations (35) shows that such injuries were transferred 
from the Continent to 12 neuro- surgical centres in the United 
Kingdom as promptly as transport facilities permitted. 
Spurling's contention that certain points in forward manwgement 
are better standardised is borne out by the figures quoted. His 
statement that 'Experimental and histopathological evidence 
indicates that the optimum time for end to end suture of a 
severed/ 
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severed nerve is between the 3rd and the 9th week after injury, 
and that repair between the 21st and 28th days is probably 
productive of the best end results and can be carried out with 
the least technical difficulties, leads one to wonder if speedy 
evacuation by air is so essential after all. 
The transference of British patients to peripheral 
nerve centres was always considered of high priority, and I 
contend that this is the logical outlook. Once forward surgery, 
by excision of the devitalised tissues, by approximation of the 
divided ends of the nerves if possible and if not by anchoring 
the ends to the surrounding soft tissues, by adequate splinting 
and by delayed primary suture, has been carried out, it is 
important to transfer the patient as quickly as possible to a 
peripheral nerve centre. 
Experimental work on rabbits shows that the longer 
the delay between injury and repair, the less likely is there to 
be full recovery of function, and gives added justification to 
the high priority grading given to such cases. In addition, the 
experience of many of the British nerve injury centres was that 
far too many men were delayed on their way to such centres. 
The question of the advocacy of Tjrimary or early 
secondary suture - a highly controversial one (36), (37), (3S), (39), 
must rest with the individual neuro- surgeon. One thing-is 
certain, that the sooner the -patient reaches his care, the more 
likely is the terminal result to be satisfactory for the patient. 
After initial surgery in the field, the decision 
on when and how to complete the treatment is the task of a 
specialist/ 
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specialist neuro- surgeon. The task of air evacuation is to 
convey the patient to him quickly, and with minimal danger, and 
thus to increase the patient's subsequent chance of recovery. 
There are no s-)ecìfic difficulties involved in the 
aerial transportation of such cases. 
S -I&ARY UF PERIPHERAL NERVE INJUPIES. 
(1). Early specialised care of the peripheral nerve injury 
at a specialised centre is advocated. 
(2). Standardised primary surgery followed by speedy evacuation 
for primary or early secondary suture at a peripheral 
nerve centre would appear advisable. 
(z). Evacuation is satisfactorily accomplished by air and 
involves no specific difficulties. 
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1SE VRb1P vLl':iJiiARi ri V VlrDí.7 . 
Six-percent ' of all cases evacuated 
by air from North 
West 3urope fell into this category. 
It is essential for the Medical Officer in charge 
of the selection of such cases for Aerial evacuation 
to be 
conversant with the broad principles governing their surgical 
treatment. In the early phases of a military operation, 
such knowledge is of supreme importance because at infrequent 
intervals, he may be called upon to institute treatment 
himself during transit. 
primarily, this treatment is aimed at the arrest 
of haemorrhage, the correction of the profound disturbances 
in cardio -respiratory physiology and the prevention of 
infection. Generally speaking, the steps which he may 
have to take are the aspiration of air and blood from 
the pleural sac, intercostal nerve block, relief of a 
tension pneumothorax, the re- application of a pad over the 
wound of a sucking pneumothorax, oxygen administration 
and transfusion. To this may be added the haemostasis 
of intercostal vessels (40 ). 
In the later phases of the campaign, he may expect to 
receive for evacuation cases which have been treated for 
several days or weeks in General Hospitals. It is wise for 
such a medical officer to know the accepted theories on 
w ounds/ 
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rounds of the lungs and pleura. Consideration of the 
surgery in such phases is essential, as it bears important 
relationship to the subsequent probability of the _a.tient 
becoming suitable for evacuation by air 
The general arinciples involved in the surgery 
of pleuropulmonary wounds are: - 
(1). A sucking wound must be sealed off (41 ). 
(2). Tension pneunothorax, often associated with surgical 
emphysema, generally caused by a lung wound and 
frequently without an external wound ( 42) must be 
relieved (41 ). This type of wound is more common 
in crushing than penetrating injuries. 
(3). Paradoxical movement of the chest wall must be 
stabilised (L3), (4d ). 
(4). Progressive haemorrhage into the pleural cavity 
mast be controlled. 
(5). Haemothoraces are best treated by early and repeated 
aspirations, generally without air replacement (42), 
( 45), (46 ). `inimal air replacement may, 
however, assist in t e complete aspiration of the 
Pleural cavity at certain times (47 ). In the opinion 
of most chest surgeons the incidence of infection 
increases/ 
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increases and pleural thickening is more likely to 
occur if haemothoraces are not aspirated (47) (48). In 
passing, it should be noted that the danger 
of intra- 
pleural haemorrhage as a result of aspiration seems 
to have been exaggerated (47), and that the blood in 
such cases tends to remain fluid probably because of 
defibrination by the movements of the heart and 
lungs (41) . 
(6). The drainage of empyemata when localisation has occurred. 
Let us consider the aim of the surgeon and how it 
affects subsequent evacuation by air. 
There are certain physiological considerations in 
te transport of chest injuries by air which are peculiar to 
air evacuation alone. Anoxia, the evidence of which becomes 
.manifest in normal individuals at 10 to 15,000 feet (49) is more 
prone to occur in patients who have suffered pleuropulmonary 
damage. Alteration in the volume of entrapped air in the 
pleural cavity due to decreased atmospheric pressure in 
flight occurs in cases in which pneumothorax or mediastinal 
emphysema. exists. While surgical emphysema rarely involves 
damger to the ratient' s life, the same is not true of 
mediastinal emphysema. It can cause compression of the 
large/ 
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large veins, and by interfering with the venous return to 
the heart, reduce cardiac output. This cardio- respiratory 
embarrassment is more likely to arise during flight at 5,000 
feet and above, than at ground level. whereas a bilateral 
closed pneumothorax might be fairly well tolerated at 
:round level if the amount of air in the pleural cavities 
was small, the same does not apply at 5,000 feet. 
Tension nneumothorax, by collapsing the lung, 
displacing the mediastinum and depressing the diaphragm, creates 
respiratory and cardiac interference. A -point worthy of note 
here is that the treatment which would relieve the symptoms 
of altitude sickness in a normal individual will not be 
effective against the disturbed respiration arising from 
intrathoracic mechanical changes associated with ;leuronulmonary 
wounds. 
The effect of simulated altitude on pneumothoraces 
has been studied by Todd (50). Five patients with various 
types of pneumothorax, right and left, mobile and partly 
fixed mediastinum, with and without adhesions, with and 
without fluid, and one with a broncho- pleural fistula, were 
subjected to decorm;ression. The study elicited certain 
important information. One case with a complete pneunothorax 
showed gross mediastinal shift radiologically at a simulated 
altitude of 9,000 feet. Pain was usually the limiting factor 
which/ 
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which preventedpatients being taken to greater altitudes. 
The introduction of a needle before flight was advocated. 
Peterson et al (51 ), investigated two cases, both 
tuberculous, by decompressing them at 1,000 feet :er minute 
with the provision of excess oxygen throughout the 
investigation. One case had a 20% pneumothorax and the 
other a 50% pneumothorax. The former reached a pressure 
equivalent to 20,000 feet without showing any marked loss 
in oxygen saturation or mediastinal shift. The latter 
patient began coughing and became distressed at between 
lO and 15,000 feet. His oxygen saturation was impaired at 
15,000 feet. Important inferences to be drawn from this 
investigation are that a patient with pneumothorax should 
be carefully examined before evacuation by air and relief 
of the pneumothorax by aspiration considered, that oxygen 
should be given from ground level, and that cough should be 
allayed by sedatives. The most important conclusion is that 
patients with limited -pneumothoraces need not be denied 
the benefits of aerial evacuation. The amount of fixation 
by adhesions and the extent of lung fibrosis in Peterson's 
cases must have affected to some extent their liability to 
develop symptoms. While it does not nec- .ssarily follow 
that/ 
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follow that the observations of Feterson can 
be applied 
to battle casualties, the inclusion of this investigation 
in the section on pleuropulrnonary wounds seems justified. 
One of the most important considerations in the 
treatment of penetrating chest injuries involving the pleura 
is early pulmonary expansion. The steps taken surgically 
prior to evacuation are all in the right direction as far 
as subsequent evacuation by air is concerned. The closure 
of a sucking chest, the evacuation of air or blood from the 
pleural sac, and the stabilisation of paradoxical movement 
are all beneficial to the patient from the distant view- 
point of subsequent evacuation by air, as well as from the 
immediate surgical aspect. As the normal surgical 
treatment of a tension pneumothorax is decompression, 
of a sucking neumothorax conversion to a closed simple 
one, and of a haemothorax aspiration, any doubts which might 
exist regarding the disposal of such cases to base by air 
subsequently can be dispelled. 
The thesis of entrapped air propounded by Goldman 
( 52), tends to be irrelevant unless casualties are 
being flown before surgical treatment. In such circumstances, 
Wholehearted agreement is given to hit statement' that a 
closed 
closed tension pneumothorax must be relieved before 
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evacuation, and a sucking wound converted to a closed one. 
I have seen no evidence to support or contradict his 
affirmation that surgical emphysema may need incision as 
a result of altitude. 
With regard to increased altitude and the cardio- 
vascular changes associated with it in thoracic injuries, I 
would go further than Goldman and say that no significant 
changes are noted under 4,000 feet. His suggested upper 
limit is 3,000 feet. Four thousand feet is the figure 
recommended by Todd C50 ), who qualifies his statement 
that no patient with a wound pneumothorax should fly at 
over this height by adding 'unless as much air as possible 
is removed from the pleural sac at ground level,. 
While on the subject of the altitude of 4,000 
feet, it is noteworthy that one pleuropulmonary wound which 
was reported to have died during evacuation in the South 
Pacific did so after flying for two hours at this height. 
Flaherty and his co- workers (53 ) assert that death was due to 
intrathoracic haemorrhage. It is to be relaembered in this 
association that a man can bleed to death into his own 
pleural cavity without undue embarrassment of respiration 
from diminution of pulmonary volume 
Before/ 
(41 ). 
Before proceeding to t. :e transit pharmacology, 
one controversial question remains to be raised. Is it 
better for a pleuropulmonary wound to fly uncomfortably 
at 4,000 feet in rough weather or to fly comfortably at 
6,000 feet? My personal opinion is that there is no 
doubt that less danger is caused to a patient with a chest 
wound from flying at 6,000 feet than is caused by his 
suffering from airsickness, retching, and vomiting at 4,000 
feet. This opinion has stood the test of trial successfully , 
and I do not hesitate to commend it more particularly when 
oxygen can be administered if there is the least sign of 
dyspnoea due to the increase in altitude. Crews of 
aircraft must be guided on suitable heights at which to fly 
by the medical officer in charge of the evacuation. 
Attention will now be given to the consideration 
of several therapeutic and pharmacological features of the 
transit of pleuropulmonary wounds. 
The relief of pain which effects an improvement 
in the respiratory movements and often encourages the patient 
to cough more freely (40) can be affected safely by the 
exhibition of morphine in doses up to a ÿ grain I.M.I. or 
if necessary 1/6th grain intravenously (44). Large doses of 
morphine, however, abolishthe cough reflex and may cause 
c_epression/ 
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depression of respiration (41 ), (43 ). Pain associated with 
intercostal nerve injury is relieved by morphine, and this 
drug is not contraindicated in controlling pain and shock 
provided it is used in an intelligent way. 
Another satisfactory method of relieving pain is 
by inte. oostal nerve block. One percent procaine is injected 
at the rib angles of the painful area and at two: segments 
above and below it. This, by diminishing the pain, 
generally leads to the coughing up of excessive bronchQ- 
pulmonary secretions, which is desirable. 
Barbiturates for sedation are contraindicated 
where low oxygen and high carbon dioxide concentrations exist 
in the blood (41 ). Atropine should be withheld except 
pre -operatively, as it increases the viscosity of the bronchial 
secretions (41 ) and makes the expulsion of them by coughing 
more difficult. Coramine is an effective respiratory 
stimulant, and was available in all aircraft flying casualties. 
Blood or plasma transfusion must 
be used with caution, because over -liberal introduction of 
intravenous fluid can precipitate pulmonary oedema(44). 
Oxygen is best administered to anoxic cases at 
7 litres per minute, using a mask preferably of the B.L.B. 
type. Oxygen could not be given to all pneumothoraces 
from 
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from ground level as was suggested by Peterson et al (51). 
It had to be reserved for cases requiring it therapeutically 
and not prophylactically. In the early Normandy daÿs, 
3% of casualties required oxygen in transit, while in the 
later stages in France, Belgium, Holland and Germany, this 
fi_ure fell to 0.7% . This may be taken to illustrate 
the essential difference in the transport of partly treated 
and fully treated pleuropulmonary casualties by air. 
Patients with chest injuries need not be forbidden 
to smoke during transit unless smoking induces uncontrollable 
bouts of coughing. Breathing exercises should be continued 
whenever circumstances permit. 
Penicillin parenterally should be exhibited during 
transit where its administration has already been commenced. 
If aspiration is necessary in an air evacuation centre, 
penicillin should be introduced into the pleural sac when 
the aspiration is completed. A dosage of 30,000 units in 
20 c.c's. of saline is suggested. Of the cases seen 
during evacuation, only ß had empyemata and only in very 
4 
occasional cases were drainage tubes seen. This was 
probably due to the fact that most cases were evacuated 
to/ 
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to the United Kingdom before the infection had become 
sufficiently localised for drainage to be instituted. There 
is no doubt that penicillin intra -pleurally and systemically' 
as an adjunct to thorough surgery and early aspiration had 
a favourable influence on the occurrence of empyema. 
Thoraco -centesis should be performed before 
evacuation if the pleural cavity is suspected to contain more 
than 500 c.cts of fluid, or i dyspnoea, cardiac or mediastinal 
.displacement exists in conjunction with fluid ( 44). 
Aspiration can be carried out until 1,000 c.cts jf fluid are 
removed or until the patient complains of tightness in the 
chest. The truth of the observation by Ross (54) that it 
is as reprehensible not to aspirate the pleural effusion of 
a dyspnoeic patient as to fail to split a plaster is generally 
accepted. 
The treatment of tension pneumothorax and sucking 
pneumothorax has been mentioned previously, and further 
discussion here is unnecessary. 
The position of the patient on the stretcher and 
in the aircraft is important. Pleuropuimonary wounds should 
travel sitting up and supported by a back rest. Such stretcher 




The evacuation of pleuropulmonary wounds is usually 
carried out about the 7th day after wounding. It is felt that 
evacuation from the third day onwards, depending on the 
patients general condition, can be safely effected. 
Agreement on this statement can be found in German and Russian 
literature. V. Brandis (55 ) believes the optimum time for 
evacuation to be between the 2nd and 7th days, while Demudov 
(56) thinks that chest injuries should be held at the place 
of operation for 3 to 5 days before evacuation. Too 
evacuation of patients with severe haemothorax or 
pneumothorax is also deprecated by Wildegans and Bansi (57 ). 
The decision as to when a case is fit for 
evacuation should rest primarily with a physician who can be 
guided on the surgical advisability by a surgical confrère. 
Schn,oele and his associates (58 ) consider that 
casualties with pleuropulmonary injuries can and have been 
safely and advantageously transported by air to rear Naval 
hospitals in the South Pacific despite the danger from 
diminished partial pressure of oxygen at altitudes. 
There is no doubt that the saine findings 




is felt that the surgery 
already performed in operated cases 
allowed them to travel well. 
Such is not the case in the 
early phases of a military operation, 
as in Normandy, where 
several cases received little 
more than essential first aid 
treatment before earlier evacuation. 
The amount of oxygén 
necessary during transit appears to 
be a guide to the adequacy 
of surgical treatment. 
SUi:.ARY . 
(1). Six percent of all cases evacuated from North West Europe 
were pleuropulmonary wounds. Eight - ;percent of these had 
been diagnosed as having empyemata. In the early stages 
of the liberation of Europe, 3% required oxygen therapy 
in transit. This figure fell to 0.7% as the campaign 
progressed. 
(2). Medical officers in charge of air evacuation centres 
should be conversant with the essentials of pleuro- 
pulmonary wound treatment, so that they may be able to 
carry out any required treatment before emplaning. 
This is more important in the early stages of a 
military operation than subsequently. 
(3).'The surgical steps taken to treat chest wounds improve 
their prospects of successful evacuation by air. 




Occasional penetrating abdominal injuries within a 
short time of wounding found their way to air evacuation 
centras in the early days of the Normandy bridgehead. 
This was unplanned, but cannot be condemned in the 
stress of that period;with the difficulties in triage and 
the amount of operative surgery to be done, it would have been 
a miracle if it had not happened by accident a few times. 
None of these cases died in the aircraft, but unfortunately 
I have been unable to follow up -their future treatment. The 
reason why they were loaded on to aircraft was that with the 
prevailing conditions, congested rutted roads, casualty 
clearing stations overflowing, and surgeons operating for 
more than 12 hours at a stretch, the risk to the patient was 
no greater than it would have been in returning him by road 
ambulance to the nearest surgical unit. Flying at 
1,000 to 2,000 feet, for 50 minutes, he could be at an 
airfield in England where surgery could be performed 
should it be impossible to move him to the nearest hospital 
10 miles away without increasing t.,e danger to his life. 
In subsequent phases of the war in North West Europe, 
abdominal wounds were rarely sent from hospitals for 
evacuation until at least 10 and usually 14 days after 
operation (59 ), (60 ), (61 ). 
rather/ 
Even so, such cases travel 
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rather worse than other types of casualty at the same 
or earlier post-operative time (59 ), (62 ). They travel 
as well by air at this time as they do by sea, and should 
be transported by air ( Li). 
The slow climb from ground level to 1,000 to 
6,000 feet and flight between those levels cannot cause 
danger to the scar by distension of the bowel from 
intestinal gas expansion. Air sickness would reasonably 
be expected to be more dangerous, and attempts were always wade to 
exclude abdominal injuries from aircraft loads being flown 
in rough weather. 
The generally lowered physical state of the patient 
who is recovering from operation for a penetrating abdominal 
injury seems to create an apprehension to travel in any form, 
and although none of there refused evacuation by air, they, 
more frequently than any other type of casualty, required 
reassurance on the subject of aircraft and f lying. 
Therapeutically,-the supervision or initiation of 
transfusion of blood or plasma, preferably the former, the 
withholding of fluids by mouth and the judicious use of 
morphine (63) are the only steps which an Air Evacuation 
Officer can take when pre- operative penetrating abdominal 
injuries accidentally find their way to him. The nursing 
of the operated case in transit centres round the attention 
of/ 
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of the colostoiry, if present, and the supply of a suitable 
dietary if possible. The working of colostomies did not 
seem to be affected by flight at 1,000 to 6,000 feet. The 
percentage of colostomies carried was high in abdominal 
wounds evacuated by air, conforming with the standard British 
practice. Breathing exercises should be continued during 
transit as they diminish the liability to pulmonary 
complications (64). 
Death, attributed to shock following abdominal 
distension during flight in a case of peritonitis is 
reported by Flaherty et al ( 53 ) from the South Pacific. 
They assert that it is dangerous to fly abdominal cases 
until several days after operation when abdominal 
distension has subsided. 
Air is no exception to the basic rule governing the 
movement of abdominal injuries. The transport by air of 
penetrating abdominal injuries before the 14th post- operative 
day is deprecated unless of a)solute necessity. Even after 
such time it is inadvisable to fly such cases in rough. 
weather. 
It would appear that the life of a penetrating 
belly undergoing resuscitation, in transit to a surgical 
centre, is not any more endangered by aerial transport 
than by other means, provided the time from ~,wounding to 
operation/ 
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operation does not exceed ten hours at the outside. 
If a comparison could. be made between two similar 
penetrating abdominal wounds, one flying with resuscitation 
pre - operatively, and still being operated on within eight 
hours of wounding, and another flying for the same length of 
time on any clay up to the 7th day after operation, I am 
certain the prognosis would be more favourable in the case 
Of the former. 
Regarding evacuation, the inference that the use of 
local anaesthesia in abdominal wounds as described by 
Pschenichnikov ( 65) allowed evacuation immediately after 
operation must be accepted with reserve until more 
conclusive proof is forthcoming. 
Thoraco-abominal wounds, of which a relatively 
small i)ercenta4ge survive, travel as well as the average 
penetrating wounds of the gut. The rules governing the 
evacuation of abdominal injuries appertain to such cases. 
SUMMARY or ABDOMINAL INJURIES. 
(1). _'penetrating wounds of the abdomen should not travel by 
air before the 14th post -operative day. 
(c). Rough _weather should be avoided even after the 14th day. 
(3). Although cases should not be moved pre- operatively, 
there is nothing to indicate that they suffer more from 




(4) . Reassurance is importent before fliZn±. 
(5). noraco- abdominal wounds travel as well as other 
abdominal injuries.- The abdominal and not the thoracic, 
are the features to be considered when choosing the time 
of evacuation. 
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LARGE FLESH W c.UNDS . 
Such wounds when encountered during transit fall 
into two classes - those which are complicated by bony 
injury and those which are not. Both varieties benefit 
as much as any other type of casualty from rapid. air 
evacuation. 
In a busy period, when forward units may only have 
time to carry out the initial treatment of such injuries, 
speedy evacuation is important. If a patient cannot be held 
under observation for three or four days until delayed 
primary suture can be performed, the risk of anaerobic 
infection occurring in the wound during slow evacuation to 
base cannot be disregarded. Particularly is this the case 
in the Low Countries 'and France (66 ) . 
Doubtless the risk has been greatly diminished by the 
introduction of penicillin into the armamentarium of the 
surgeon, but it remains a very real one nevertheless. Slow 
transit, over a period of 24 to 36 hours, may render the 
gbaervation of such cases difficult and operation virtually 
impossible. A transit period of short duration, as is 
provided by. air evacuation, would appear to have a definite 
advantage in this respect. Especially is this the case 
when damage has occurred to a blood vessel supplying a 
large grown of muscles, as well as to the muscles 
themselves/ 
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themselves. . Parenteral penicillin is relatively 
ineffective, as the drug never reaches the damaged tissues. 
The risi: of infective myositis in such cases is greatly 
increased. Air evacuation in those circumstances would appear 
to be indicated because of the shortness of time spent in 
transit. This in itself di: inishes the risk of subsequent 
loss of a limb or death by toxaemia. 
The first casualty that I saw in Normandy had such a 
wound which was the seat of anaerobic infection. This 
experience led me to have great respect for large flesh 
wounds and to accord. them the high priority grading which 
I consider they deserved, if they were being evacuated 
before delayed primary suture. After delayed suture the 
Priority of such cases is low because healing is usually 
fast and satisfactory., assisted by ore- and post -operative 
penicillin. 
The danger of secondary haemorrhage in untreated 
flesh wounds must never be forgotten while they are in 
transit. It is apt to be overlooked until it is encountered, 
and if srecial watch is not kept for it, resuscitative 
measures may be delayed until they are too late to be 
effective. It is iraortant to remember that it is the 
,task of the medical officer evacuating surgically untreated 
wounds 
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wounds by air to contribute as much as possible toward 
the preparation of the casvelty for surgery. He must be 
conversant with and observe the fundamental principles 
involved in the treatment of wound shock. 
In the initial pliase of a combined operation, when 
for tactical reasons the evacuation of virtually untreated 
casualties may be essential, early and speedy evacuation 
contributes toward:soetter terminal surgical results. 
Despite penicillin, travelling transfusions and sulpha 
drugs, the most important anti- bacterial agent is early 
evacuation as it brims the casualty to the operating 
table ( 67). Air evacuation played a large part as an anti- 
bacterial agent in the bridgehead days. 
Flesh wounds involving bone had all been immobilised 
before evacuation, even in Normandy. All unpadded casts had 
been split before the patient started transit, and there were 
very few justifiable complaints from the patients regarding 
the tightness of their plasters. Any such complaints must 
be taken seriously however, as there are several complicat- 
ions associated with a tight plaster. The main ones are the 
development of pressure sores, and nerve palsies. The 
detection. of gas gangrene under such a plaster is also less 
likely (63 ). Critical observation of constitutional signs 
and/ 
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and symptoms should prevent this dangerous oversight from 
happening. These complications are obviously more likely 
to arise when careful watch is not continually maintained 
on the plasters. A predisposing factor toward their 
occurrence is a lengthy transit period, which is avoided by 
the use of aircraft. 
Similarly, a road journey along extended lines of 
'evacuation, which may be very uncomfortable for a patient 
with a compound fracture, especially if a good plaster technique 
is not adhered to (69 ), can be avoided. by air transport. 
SUMMARY OF L OGE FLESH WOUNDS. 
(1). Incompletely treated cases should be ,riven a high 
priority during evacuation, especially from North 
West Europe, because of the danger of gas infection. 
This is more than ever necessary if a blood vessel 
supplying the wounded area has been damaged. 
(2). Secondary haemorrhage may occur and should be kept 
in mind. 
(3). Flesh wounds after delayed primary suture are of low 
priority for air evacuation. 
(4). In untreated cases rapid and early air evacuation 
can be classed as an anti -bacterial agent. 
(5). Complaints about the tightness of plasters should 
be investigated carefully. 
(6)/ 
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(6). Air evacuation provides the most comfortable method 
of transport for immobilised compound fractures, 
and for siAple fractures also. 
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BURNS. 
Cases suffering from burns travel well by air, 
provided the nor ,al procedure regarding the relief of shock 
and pain is complied with. 
FACIO- AXILL RY INJURIES. 
The advisability of treating such injuries at 
specialised centres qualifies them for Priority .)ne air 
'evacuation. The difficulties of feeding them orally may 
be overcome by using a Byle!s tube. Careful attention must 
be paid to tracheotomy tubes when present. Involvement of 
the sinuses did not appear to contra -indicate air transport. 
EYE INJURIES. 
Penetrating injuries t; pith or without lodged foreign 
bodies were afforded priority transportation. Their transit 
presented no difficulties. 
EAR INJURIES. 
Flight below 6,000 feet did not cause any apparent 
ill- effects on tatients suffering from blast injuries of 
the membrana tympani. Many of these had other injuries 
which made their air evacuation a matter of necessity. The 
slight discomfort, of which occasional patients complained, 
may have been due to L oatency the Eustachian tubes. 
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SURGICAL THERAPEUTICS, 'iITH SPECIaI, t2EFET;1`10E TO 
I'LNI CIi,LIN. 
The dressing of all wounds durin' transit, unless 
indicated for any specific reáson, was avoided because of 
the very great danger of introducing infection. After the 
early Normandy phase it was completely unnecessary except 
for very occasional dressings which lead become unfastened in 
one way or another. 
Regarding the surgical aspect of the caaljaign in 
North West Europe, there is no divergence of ooinion on. one 
thing. In comparison with the wounds of previous 
campaigns, the wounds of this campaign showed an absence 
of serious sepsis and a generally reduced incidence of 
all wound. infections. It is accepted that penicillin 
therapy is the main reason, although not necessarily the 
only one. 
To quote from 'Penicillin Therapy and Control in 
21 Army Group (66 :- 'All trie dangerous pathogens found 
in war wounds are penicillin sensitive,and if one can get the 
penicillin into contact with them and maintain it there in 
an adeouate concentration for a sufficient period of time, 
these or Lnisms should be inhibited or destroyed. Prevention 
is better than cure, so it is obviously desirable to exploit 
penicillin 
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penicillin prophylactically at the earliest practicable 
stage and in the roost effective manner possible. The basis 
of the penicillin policy in 21 Arrry Group since D -Day has 
been prophylaxis. Arrangements were made to use penicillin 
both parenterallÿ and locally at the most forward surgical 
levels so that casualties should receive it as soon as 
possible after ,; ounc.ing. Arrangements were also made 
ensuring that penicillin, once started, should be continued 
no matter how or where the -patient went, until such time as 
he had been evacuated or until a surgeon decided that the 
treatment could be terminated'. 
There can be no doubt that the incidence. and severity 
of wound infections have diminished because of thie2enerous 
use f penicillin.(66 ). 
In the early days of the bridgehead, tie initial air 
evacuation units were not always able t'o obtain sufficient 
penicillin, nor were they always able to administer it during 
transit owin to the rush and the necessity of speedy loading 
of casualties. 
When one large unit took over all of the evacuation 
by air at. B. 14 in Normandy, it became possible to administer 
it routinely. Penicillin, from this time to the end of the 
war in Europe, was administered parenterally in 20/40,000 unit 




by the evacuating surgeon. If there was a delay of a few 
hours prior to evacuation, the dosage was kept up, and later 
in the campaign, with lengthening flights, double booster 
doses were given if the casualty was not likely to arrive in 
the United kingdom before his next injection was due. 
The penicillin used by the smaller air evacuation 
flights was drawn daily from the nearest Arwy Hospital, but 
the larger flights carried stocks of their own. 
Local penicillin was rarely used during transit. 
Vinere irrigation tubes had been installed and its continuation 
advised, it was given according to the instructions of the 
evacuating surgeon. 
In ac- chition, to parenteral penicillin, _many cases 
received oral sulpha drugs. In the light of the since 
accumulated evidence ( 66) , there would appear to have been 
no necessity to risk the toxic effects of this group of 
drugs by continuing their administration. 
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THE CONSIDERATION OF SOME i< DICAL ASPECTS JF 
.IR IV.CUATI)N. 
The percentage of medical cases carried by air from 
.North West Europe to the United Kingdom was roughly 15% of 
tie total evacuated. This estimate is based on the analysis 
of 5,000 cases evacuated to England at different stages of 
the Campaign. The percentage of medical patients transported 
to the Continental base areas by shuttle aircraft was double 
the above figure. 
It will be noted that casualties were rarely flown at 
altitudes of over 6,000 feet, and all observations refer to flight 
under such height. 
This section is divided into: - 
(1). The transport by air of patients with diseases of - 
(i) . T'ne cardio- vascular system. 
(ii).The-respiratory system. 
(iii).The alimentary system. 
(iv).The central nervous system. 
(v).The haemopoietic system. 
(vi).The ear, nose and throat. 
(vii).An infectious nature. 
(2) . Air sickness. 
(3) . The relation of psychology and psychiatry to air evacuation. 
(4). Therapeutics in relation to altitudes. 
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(i). T'rIF Tß..NSPORT BY PATIFddTS j'dI TH DI SEASE S Ob' 
(i). THE CARDI 0-VASSCULAR SYSTEM. 
Patients suffering from valvular diseases of the 
heart, both compensated and uncompensated, were found to be 
transportable by air without risk. There would appear to be 
little danger of anoxia occurring at heights below 6,000 feet 
if the patient is fit to be moved from hospital for evacuation. 
Where a reasonable cardiac reserve exists there is no danger 
of anoxia at such heights. 
Angina pectoris would not seem to be affected by flight 
at low altitudes, although I suspect that anginal pain might 
easily occur in flight in an individual of an emotional nature, 
or in the event of stress, say due to the failure of one engine 
in flight. Although I encountered no case of coronary 
thrombosis, I can see no reason why flying either early or late 
cases of this disease should be contraindicated if routine 
therapeutic measures have been instituted and the patient's 
general condition -permits. 
Oxygen should always be carried and used if any 
tendency to dyspnoea is noted in cardiac patients. 
(ii) . THE IESPIRATORY SYSTEg. 
The effects of altitude on pneumo -, haemo-, and haemo- 
pneumo- thorax have already been considered in the -surgical-section. 
The/ 
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The conclusions drawn there apply equally to cases of 
artificial pneumo- thorax, spontaneous pneurnothorax, and pleurisy 
with effusion. Plieeht at low altitudes would not appear to 
rrecipitate the occurrence of spontaneous pneu.eo- thorax in 
normal individuals. It is generally considered inadvisable 
to fly __atients who have had a recent haeynoptysis, but no 
evidence to prove this can be cited from the evacuation of such 
casualties from North West Europe. 
All t +es of tuberculous .atients were transported ey 
air,- particularly after T -Day, when et- risoners of war sere 
b: ine flown hone. No ill -effects re ulteee from fli at were 
noted by the medical officers receiving such casualties, and 
no untoward effects occurred durine the air _í assaee . Three 
cases cf ïniliary tuberculosis -which i evacuated c<id not apsear 
distressed duricg their evacuation, although one was just 
dyspnoeic at around level aed required oxygen _: :;ome 
of the evacuated tuberculous, cases had. been 
artificial ;,nenmo-tharam. It is sogËested that it %.uläWE_ : elous 
patients are- beine flown, this procedure sllould be delayed 
until after the flieht or at the most a 2:-.¡-254 pneumothorax 
not exceeded. 
In oleuro- pulmonary medicine, 
flight obviously depends mainly on the 
the presence or absence of mediastinal 
the amount of functioning lung tissues, 
obtainable during flight. 
The availability of oxygen 
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the suitability for 
patient's general condition, 
displacement or cavitation, 
and whether oxygen is 
on the aircraft is stressed 
during the transportation by air of all patients with respiratory 
diseases. It can be used beneficially as a prophylactic 
measure from ground level in the most serious respiratory 
complaints where dyspnoea Might arise in transit. Gxygen, to 
be of ootimim assistance, should be given before dyspnoea 
arises. 
Tuberculous patients travelling among other patients 
should be loaded in the lowest berth and should wear a mask. 
(iii) . ALTHENTARY SYS yJIi. 
Pew specific difficulties are associá.ted with the aerial 
transportation of patients with diseases of this system. At 
the usual altitude at which evacuation took place, any expansion 
of the gas in the intestine which did occur was insufficient 
to give rise to symptoms. 
When patients with peptic ulcers are being 
air -evacuated it is advisable for each one to be supplied 




Patients with ulcers who have had haematemeses should not 
be transported unless their haemoglobin level is over jo;. 
gastric accidents, such as i_erforation or haernatemeses,occurred 
during transit. It would have been of interest to observe 
the effect of flight on a ;perforation, because I can see no 
reason why such a case should not be flown to the nearest 
surgeon. I contend that the transport by air of an early 
perforation from say Tiree to 'slas -`ow within six hours of its 
occurrence would not materially alter the chance of survival. 
Flight during rough weather should be avoided in 
patients with peptic ulceration because of the risk of air 
sickness and possible haema.te:ceses. 
(iv) . TiE CAL 1' V? CJS SYST2M. 
In the surgical section of cranial wounds it nas already 
been noted that if anc:-ia is avoided no significant increase in 
intracranial pressure occurs üurinV casualty evacuation by air 4p.36). 
It is lcnown that hyperventilation al c losis or anoxia can 
precipitate attacks of petit :cal in suspectible individuals. 
The liability to loss of consciousness and syncopal reactions at a 
simulated altitude of 18,000 feet, without oxygen for 15 minutes, 
has been studied by Baxter et al (70). Their investigation 
indicated / 
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indicated that many of those developing syncopal reactions 
had central nervous system disorders which tend to epilepsy. 
Anoxia is only likely to arise during air evacuation below 
6,000 feet in the -presence of cardiac, respiratory or 
haemopoietic disease. It can be avoided by the intelligent 
use of oxygen in the two former and by blood transfusion 
in the latter and is no contra -indication to the evacuation 
of the majority of - ;atients. Provided adequate therapeutic 
measures are taken to prevent anoxia, nc rise in the 
cerebrospinal fluid pressure should occur, nor should there be 
any dan?er of syncope in any patient whether he has a tendency to 
epilepsy or not. The war in Europe proved that air -evacuation 
of ratients with diseases of the central nervous system can be 
effected safely. None of the .patients evacuated developed 
syncopal attacks or unconsciousness and. symptomatically there 
did not aprear to be any gross variation in intracranial ;,ressure, 
judged by alteration in the severity -if their headache. 
Two patients whom I accompanied to England on four hour 
flights were suffering from meningitis. One was of meningococoal 
on ?in and the other tuberculous, but on a purely clinical 
assessment neither showed any detrimental effects attributable to 
transport .by air. Neither case had had other than routine 
treatment in -preparation for his aerial journey. Another 
patient who travelled without deterioration in nis general 
con&ition/ 
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condition was suCfering from poliomyelitis with diaphrzmatic 
Paresis. Durin5. transit he was continuously supplied with 
oxygen tnd his breathin`r assisted by artificial respiration. 
He reached a rrinker machine in the United Kingdom in good 
condition, Laving exhibited no syncopal suns during transit 
despite the difficulty of providing him with oxygen. 
Aithouch epileptics were not routinely flown from the 
Continent, I can find no physiological or medical reason for 
their exclusion from aircraft, except that they might have had 
a convulsion in the air. There is no reason to assu;ae that 
such a convulsion would have been any more dangerous to the 
patients at 6,000 feet than at ground level, but the restraint 
of such a -natient might have been impossible by the nursing 
orderly of the aircraft. The exclusion of epileptics from an 
aircraft is therefore a justifiable and necessary safety 
precaution. 
(v) HAEMOPOIETIO SYST2ÌI. 
Advanced anaemia, no matter what its cause, can produce 
anoxia. The main problem arising from the evacuation of such 
cases is the avoidance of oxygen lack. The administration 
of oxygen will not materially assist in preventing, anoxia 
in haemopoietic disease. 011 the day before, or on the 
eay of evacuation patients whose haemoglobin level has 
fallen/ 
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fallen below 5010 should be given whole blood by transfusion 
in preparation for the journey by air. The quantity given 
should be sufficient to raise the haemoglobin to at least 50% 
and preferably higher. One patient whom I accompanied by air 
on a four hour journey to the United Kingdom was suffering 
from aplastic anaemia. His haemoglobin was raised to 70% 
-on the day before evacuation, by whole blood transfusion. 
10 ill effects were observed during flight. It must be 
remembered that anoxia may arise in such cases without the 
warning sign of cyanosis ( 71). 
(vi). EAR, NOSE AND MOAT. 
A simple explanation of the changes occurring in the 
ear during ascent and descent to altitudes is essential before 
giving the contraindications to aerial travel in otological 
cases. 
It should be remembered that air can pass easily from 
the middle ear to the throat along the Eustachian tube. Passage 
of air in. the reverse direction is not so easily accomplished.. 
Swallowing tends to open the &istachian tube and facilitate 
air entry from the throat to the middle ear. During 
ascent/ 
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ascent the decrease in atmaSpheriC ';ress":.are causes tae air in 
the midc.Iv ear ta expand and the pressure beca°.fes eanaíised 
by air passing along the Xsstachian tube into the throat. In 
the normal individual no damae to tHe c.rsm can occur 
during ascent because air can .always escape. Luring descent, 
however, t=;_ _assure i n _L_Ie ear becomes lowered_ and air 
has tO _--ass i_- 3asta:cilaA tube froa the throat if 
..ess°:Sel`e is to occur. If aciva is .tZon is 
effected t,1us,,the Qíf-.,rence in pressure rises J. tae d°aa 
bul'es inward causing pain. Svâii. as in: :;r ::le nose 
and hgosin2 assists in apcmi -Ig the Eustachian tubs: nIcc3: 
eenu.aiTsiaL the trsssare. Lf these steps are not taken the 
drum ̂ gLy rapture. Rapid descent may also s%retcb tha drum 
Tityatat< ru-yttr.rifia it and Living rise to earache ot several 
lanrs or several s tura.táoms. 
The definite possibility of rupturing ar stretching the 
Erma (taring descent exists in everyone Whc flies wit h a bTcezed 
Zastal-IT 
2he ;resance af a;_ Grf araticsn and chronic otitis .ter;,ia 
ceresr mat 7,recSn1.e aerial transportation Jeea7ase drainage 
entry are affectel through tare -peri`orati`ift. Cases of acute otitis media 
with am nnr7 ez f ccatiecl memhraíaa tympaE&i. Should not 4e L iown,: as 
the ear drum is likely to pertarat duxria,2;, ascent, or if it does 
matt 
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not, pus is liable to infiltrate into the mastoid cells. 
Sinusitis and blockage of the sinusoidal ducts give 
rise to pain which is not usually severe, during ascent and 
descent because of pressure alteration within the sinus. From 
my experience of air evacuation on the Continent it does not 
contra -indicate the transport of such cases by air unless very 
acute. 
(vii). IDTFLCTIOUS DISEASES 
Infectious diseases patients are obviously unsuitable 
for transport by air unless they are carried alone in an 
aircraft. The difficulty of fumigating the aircraft after- 
wards makes their transport so troublesome that it is not worth 
while. The necessity for it fortunately arises very seldom 
anyhow. The only cases of an infectious nature normally 
carried from Europe were tuberculous. They were always given 
a gauze mask to wear, and they were loaded on the floor of the 
aircraft where they were least likely to disseminate Koch's 
bacilli over other casualties. 
The only other infectious cases carried were mainly 
an occasional pneumonia, infective hepatitis and malaria. The 
danger of the spread of such diseases durin;z transit is too 
remote to be worth considering. 
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(2). AIR SICKNESS. 
In reasonably `ood weather it was unusual for patients to 
be airsick. In somewhat bumpy or really rough weather it was 
common to find several airsick patients in each aircraft load. 
The first of such Natients to be airsick was generally one who 
tended to be seasick or railsick and in whom one consequentlyexpected it. 
With'the others this was not always the case, and there seemed 
to be a strong pyschogenic background for their airsickness. I 
have no doubt that airsickness often has an 'infectious' origin. 
When, one patient. vomits, others seem, to follow his example 
for little reason at all. 
The overall incidence,of airsickness was less than 
In view of this figure and the doubts regarding the efficiency 
of preventative therapy, no routine treatment was given 
prophylactically. Several Army experiments on seasickness 
suggested the use of hyoscine orally in doses of .5 - 1.2 mgs 
( 72) One can assume that it may also diminish the liability 
to airsickness, bút I do not think its routine administration 
to battle casualties can be considered justified. 
To. withhold a ligit meal before evacuation on a rough 
day appears to be unreasonable as it focuses the patient's 
attention .on the possibility of his being airsick and pyscholog- 
ically rentiers it more probable. If a patient is going to be 
airsick 
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airsick anyhow, it is less Uncomfortable to have a full 
than an empty stomach. 
(3) . THE RELATION OF PSYCHOLOGY ArD PSYCHIATRY I 
AIR EVAGUITIí7I. 
The existence of undoubted aerial supremacy over the 
Continent and United Kingdom and the.justifiable confidence in 
British and Dominion air and ground crews, accounted for the fact 
that no Allied casualty in 20, 000 of which I had rersonal 
experience refused to be flown. As a triaste to Goeb'oels' 
propaganda it may be stated that two Geraan prisoners of war 
in Normandy refused because they were in-doubt of our air 
superiority and feared attack by the Luftwaffe. They travelled 
by sea. 
Reassurance on the subject of flight and the absence 
of risk was :rude easy by the fact that the stock answer to. any 
question on this subject was "'fie haven't lost or injured a 
casualty yet ". To be able to keep repeating this sentence 
f r ors the beginning f a major campaign until its end speaks 
highly of the efficiency of air and ground crews alike. The 
presence of female nursing orderlies on the aircraft even as 
early as a week after D -day had an excellent pyschological 
effect on the casualties carried. These orderlies and the crews 
who flew them were never casual when patients were being: coed, 
and 
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and in an intangible and indescribable fashion seemed to 
inspire the confidence of the ara casualties who formed the 
bulk Df those carried. 
Perhaps this ability to inspire confidence was the 
legacy of the Battle of Britain, the thousand booer raids and 
the airborne landings of a-day but a 'Ile ua sais quoit existed 
which played its part in preventing the aerial journey from 
being clouded for the natient by apprehension or fear. 
Sedation of medical or surgical casualties vas very 
rarely necessary. Pyschiatrid patients, the majority of them 
suffering from battle exhaustion, did however require sedation. 
Half an hour spent recovering 20 Tatients with battle exhaustion 
from under vehicles, from ditches, slit trenches and hedges 
&urin: a night air raid in Normandy convince& me of the 
insufficiency of a three grain dose of nembutal for thTt 
sedation of slch cases. Subsequently 4 grain and so:Ltimes 
6 grain Eases were used and a good night's rest assu 
such patients awaiting aircraft overnight in an air evacuation 
centre. The 20 cases mentioned above seemed. 
to fly next morning and behaved well while airborne. 
the transportation of this ty.oe of patient is mat 
risk because of the danger of their attempttne ta 
with/ 
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with the crew of the aircraft or attempting to step out Of 
it, I think there is a tendency for those dangers to be 
exaggerated. Battle exhaustion is rarely accompanied by 
suicidal tendencies. Indeed patients suffering from this 
illness have often broken down mentally because of their 
desire to remove themselves from dangerous surroundings. 
Having agreed to flight, I feel that it is unlikely that they 
should wish to, commit suicide, but a sudden panic caused 
by their considering the possibility of the aircraft 
crashing, mskes them a danger to themselves and others. Por 
this reason such casualties were not routinely carried after 
the breakout. from the brid:ehead. Subsequently,towards YE -Day 
neuro- psychiatric patients were again afforded the benefits of 
air evacuation if certified fit for air travel by a neuropsychiat- 
rist. 
The transport of schizophrenics, manic depressives or 
patients with suicidal tendencies is contraindicated. 
It must be remembered that the majority of the casualties 
carried from North West Europe were in the 20 - 30 years age group. 
Whether people in older age groups, say 40 -50 or 50-GO, are so well 
suited psy chologically for flight is a controversial point. 
Personally I do not think that the present generation in these 




and better blind. flying and safety measures, the same will not 
necessarily apply to the 4.0 -50 age group in 20 years time 
(4) . THERAPEUTICS IN PELATION TO ALTITUDES. 
I have observed no clinical contraindications to the use 
of penicillin during flight. Peterson et al reached the 
conclusion experimentally that morphine and sulphathiazol could 
be safely given in transit to patients who were undergoing 
evacuation by air at altitudes below 1Q,000 feet ( 73), (74) . 
Clinical corroboration is provided from the results of the air 
evacuation of casualties from North West Europe. It is of 
interest to note that although in the early air evacuation from 
Normandy morphine had to be administered to 5% of the cases, 
it was less frequently necessary (1 to 2 %) in transit during the 
later stages of the campaign. This,Ao doubt,was due to the 
fact that many of the patients evacuated from Normandy had not 
been so completely treated surgically. 
There is no difficulty in maintaining fluid infusion 
or transfusion during flight, provided a cannula is introduced 
into the vein and tied in. Needles are unsatisfactory if the 
weather is at all rough. Alterations in pressure due to flight 




THE A TTLICATICN OF AI.R EVACUATION TO THE CONDITIONS OF l' ACE. 
In the Services there is no doubt that the evacuation 
of casualties by air will continue to be maintained in peace. The 
benefits of air evacuation, although mainly felt by the patients, 
can also assist in solving some of the problems of the medical 
administrator. Ad a method of evacuation: from small punitive 
expeditions against insurgents, it should be extremely useful (75 ). 
Its use as a means of quickly transferring patients with 
injuries to special systems, e.g., to head injuries, facio 
maxillary or chest centres cannot be too strongly recommended. 
In Great Britain the scope of the evacuation by aircraft 
is limited because of the limited distances. Evacuation of 
patients from islands off the Scottish coast to the mainland 
should be possible and advantageous. 
In the Dominions, however, aircraft can and will be 
used to transport patients from the backwoods to the hospital 
wards of the large cities. The evacuating medical practitioner 
should remember that there are no absolute contraindications to 
the transport of any case by air in emergency (71 ). A 
knowledge of resuscitation and the basic principles of the 
effects of flight and altitude on the body, coupled with and 
;aided by clinical experience and common sense, should enable 
any doctor to decide whether it is justifiable to transport 
a/ 
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a patient by air or not. 
The most satisfactory method of making aircraft avail- 
able for such patients would be on a (bespoke' basis. 
A State controlled and financed scheme would obviously 
be desirable. Amphibious aircraft strategically disposed on 
airfields in proximity to large hospitals would be despatched to 
-pick up patients on the request of the doctor treating the 
patient. Those aircraft would carry oxygen and medical 
equipment including blood and plasma, and a trained nurse would 
be responsible for the DDatient's well -being in transit. 
SW. !AU . 
INTRODUCTION. 
EVACUATION J' CASUALTIES IN W. 
Granted aerial supremacy, evacuation of casualties by air 
iS the method of choice in all evacuation involving distances of 
over. 100 miles, especially if a sea crossing is necessary. 
ADVANTAGES-JP AIR TRANSPORT. 
The main advantage is the shortness of time during which 
the casualty is in transit. 
DISADVANTAGZS OF AIR TRANSPORT. 
That air evacuation can rarely be used as 
the sole 
channel for disposal of casualties to base is disadvantageous. 
Pase 4, 
ET,1730RäTIaT ,F THE ALvii TAI3S DISADVAtiTAúBB 
TñCUATIu`1T BY Z.ñ. 
The advantages far outweigh the disadvantages. 
HI ST cRY aF AIR r JACUAl I z B ±û,E 1; + WAR AND 
Y'A.LIS lcz; - 1946. 
Prewar air evacuation was sroradic and on a small scale. 
Evacuation by air of casualties in the early gears of World 
Tar II was handicapped by shortage -of suitable aircraft. In 
the later months of 1942 the numbers of ,;atients evacuated in 
the .'diddle Bast rose steadily, and in 1943, 28,000 were Air 
evacuated in this theatre. In this ¡ear,air evacuation units 
formed in England ,were ready to tae a ,:art in the invasion 
of Europe. 
Eighty-two thousand casualties were transporter from 
North Testern Europe to .land without the loss by accident 
of one casualty in transit. 'This fi. ,:ire, which represents 
60% ^f all casualties transferred to the united Kingdom, does 
not include those transported by the forward shuttle service 
(42, 000) . In the Far East the percentage almost reached 
100 in forward areas. 
The chances of survival were naturally increased 
for tens of thousands of casualties. 
Tm/ 
P-_e jj. 
TFt:_ UzYmic?''.7NT C1 AIR áVACUATIX II? h.TwLAI?D A7'"J NORTH ':1;ST]au: 
ä"JRCdPE n_tUI, Srw>«r; . , 1 4 ? :,ù ..11, 1946. 
(1). The formation of Casualty Air Evacuation Units in England 
and their functions, taking into consideration the ,olicy 
of the period SeDtr., 1943, to June, 1944- 
An outline of the development of air evacuation and the 
training of personnel for duties with air evacuation units is 
given. Dakota aircraft are well suited for the transport of 
"casualties. 
(2). Air evacuation from Normandy - June, 1944 - Augt., 1944. 
The importance of self supporting mobile units in the 
initial stages of a campaign is stressed. A suitable layout 
for an air evacuation centre is pictorially represented 
(Diags. 3 and 4) 
(3). Air Evacuation throu,_hout the remainder of the campaign and 
the Forward Shuttle Service, August, 19i14 - i ay, 1945. 
nobility remains the keynote of success. A forward 
shuttle service relieves the strain on the lines of communication, 
and should be instituted as soon as tactical conditions permit. 
(4). Air Evacuation from the 3ontinent after the conclusion of 
hostilities - .ga 1 - U ` 1. 6. 
The use of a scheduled service to meet evacuation 
requirements is satisfactory, although aircraft when required 
are better secured on a 'bespoke' basis. 
SURGICAL/ 
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SURGICAL CONSID RATICUS -F AIR EVACUATIOTT. 
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. 
The importance of early definitive surgery remains 
unchanged. In periods of great activity, air evacuation 
can assist in achieving this end by transporting the casualty 
to the surgeons more quickly than in other ways. Injuries 
to special systems should be treated at s- pecialised centres. 
INJURIES TO TaE NERVOUS SYSTEM. 
(1) . CRANIAL INJURIES. 
The risks attended by aerial transportation of such 
cases are less than by other means because of the diminution 
in transit time and the relative absence of disturbance. 
Head injuries travel well by air whether treated or untreated. 
(2) . SPINAL INJm IES . 
The alteration in position of such cases during transit 
by air is important. The shortness of transit time diminishes 
the risk of bed sores and pulmonary complications. 
(3) . PERM -UR L NERVE INJURIES,. 
Standardised primary surgery followed by speedy 
evacuation for suture at a specialised centre is recommended. 
Air evacuation prevents delay in transferring the patient to 
such a centre and involves no specific difficulties. 
PI UR ULL:`ON_ RY/ 
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F'I,Eu40 UL OVARY Y OUNDS. 
Provided oxygen is available in transit and the 
evacuating medical officer is conversant with the basic principles 
of plemopulmonary wound treatment, air evacuation of patients 
with this type of wound can be safely effected, either during the 
initial or later stages of any campaign. The amount of oxygen 
used during transit would appear to give an indication of the 
,adequacy of surgical treatment. 
ABDOMINAL INJTJRI:ES. 
Penetrating abdominal wounds should not travel by air 
before the fourteenth post operative day. Rough weather should 
be avoided even after this time. Tue preoperative transport 
of penetrating abdominal injuries is not advised, although there 
are noindications that aerial transport is more detrimental to 
their condition than' other means, pr- ovidedthe journey is of 
short duration and resuscitation is provided. The fitness of 
patients with thoraco abdominal wounds for transportation is 
governed by the abdominal and not the thoracic features. 
LAPGD FLESH WOODS. 
During the initial phase of a campaign large flesh wounds, 
complicated or uncomplicated by bony injury, should have a high 
priority for evacuation by air. More especially is this the 
case from a theatre of operations where the danger of anaerobic 




Such cases travel well by air if the effects of pain 
and shock are effectively combatted. 
FACI v'".1XILL RY INJTTRIRS. 
This type of casualty merits priority for evacuation by 
air. Feeding, if difficult, can be satisfactorily effected 
by .the use of a Ryle ' s tube. 
EYE INJURIES. 
Evacuation by air presents no difficulties. 
EAR INJURIES. 
Diagnosed rupture of the membrana tympani by blast is 
not a contraindication to air evacuation. 
Injuries to the special senses which are outwith the 
compass of a general surgeon should be evacuated by air to a 
specialised surgeon if facilities for their treatment do not 
exist on the spot. 
SURGICAL THERAPEUTICS ':úITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO :PENICILLIN. 
Penicillin has reduced the incidence of infection in 
war wounds and its exhibition curing transit and flight should be 
continued if it s considered necessary. There would appear to he 
no need for treatment with sulpha drugs at the same time. 
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THE CJITSIDEI TICN JF S02,12 ,. DICAL ASP ;CT$ of AI8 EVAQUATION. 
The percentage of medical cases evacuated from North Western 
Eirobe to the United Kingdom was roughly l5N. All observations 
refer to flight under 6,000 feet. 
THE 2! AiTSPO2T BY AIR 0F ATIENTS VITH DISEASTS JF:- 
(1) . TIïE CáBDI J SIASCULAR- SYSTE 
Patients with valvular disease of the heart are air - 
transportable. Anoxia rarely occurs below 6,000 feat, and never 
if a reasonable cardiac resrve exists.',. =e1 s::ould always be 
carried and used if any tendency to dyspnoea is noted in carci:c 
cases. 
(2) . THE RESPIRATORY SYSTEM. 
Flight does not appear to precipitate tile occurrence 
of spontaneous pneu:iothorax in normal individuals. Tuberculous 
casualti es can be cru'ri,:c safely by air provided a pneurnothorax 
of over 25% Boas not exist. ùxy2en ianst be available on 
aircraft transporting patients with pleuropulmonary disease. 
(3) . THE AL I NTABY SYSTEM. 
Patients with peptic ulcers who have had haematemeses 
should not be flown' unless their haemoglobin is over the 50% level. 
Fli: ht durin_, rough weather of patients with peptic ulceration 
should be avoided because of the risk of air sickness and possible 
perforation or haerna.temesis. 
(4)1 
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(L). THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTE,4. 
The exclusion of epileptics from the benefits of aerial 
transport is only justified as a safety measure. 
(5) . THE HAEMC7i'OEITIC SYSTEM. 
Patients with haemoglobin levels of below 50% should not 
be air transported until their haemoglobin is raised by transfusion. 
Anoxia may occur in very anaemic patients without the warning sin 
of cyanosis and is not relieved by the administration of oxygen. 
(6). THE EAR, NOSE AND THROAT. 
Cases of sinusitis and otitis media are unsuited for 
aerial transport only during the acute stages. 
(7) . INFECTIOUS DISEASES. 
In the infectious stage of any illness a patient must 
travel alone in the aircraft. Fumigation of aircraft is very 
difficult. 'Tuberculous patients should wear a gauze mask and be 
loaded on the floor of the aircraft where they are less likely 
to disseminate Kochts bacilli over other passengers. If these 
precautions are taken, actively tuberculous patients may be 
flown. 
AIR SICKNESS. 
Air sickness would appear to have a strong psychogenic 
background. A low incidence - less than 14; is noted. No 




THE RELATIJN OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY TO AL EVACUATION. 
The patients must have confidence in the aircraft and 
aircrews. This can largely be achieved by past results and by 
reputation. The employment of female nursing orderlies on 
aircraft increases the feelinz of confidence and is strongly 
advocated. Cases of battle exhaustion require considerable 
sedation, but littledanger exists in their transport by air. 
Schizophrenics, .panic depressives and those with suicidal 
tendencies should be excluded from aircraft loads. 
THERAPEUTICS it RELATION TO ALTITUDES. 
Penicillin, morphine and sulpha -drugs do not appear to 
have detrimental effects on the body at altitudes below 6,000 
feet. Plasma infusions or transfusions are relatively unaffected 
by flizht at such altitudes. 
THE APPLICATION ' =F AIR 'EVACUATION TO THE CONDITIONS OF PEACE. 
Evacuation of Service casualties during peace will be 
beneficial to the ,patients as well as of assistance to the 
medical administrator. Aircraft can most satisfactorily be 
obtained on a 'bespoke' basis. The benefits of using li_ht 
aircraft or helicopters to transport casualties to hospital 
from punitive expeditions in difficult country are obvious. 
Evacuation of civilian casualties could be most 
satisfactorily/ 
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satisfactorily effected in the Dominions and possibly from 
the islands around the British coastline. 
There are no absolute contraindications to the transport 
by air of any case, in emergency. Common sense alone can enable 
any doctor to decide whether or not a casualty is air transport- 
able. 
C CECLUSI ON . 
The circumstances which prevailed during the war of 1939 
to 1945 may never exist again. Passing to the realm of 
conjecture it is not fancy to assume that the subject matter of 
this - thesis may soon become of historical interest only. 
It can be said of the past that the evacuation of 
casualties by air contributed in no small measure to the 
efficiency of the medical arrangements of the three fighting 
services. It secured a place in modern warfare from which it 
can only be ousted by a better and quicker means of casualty 
transportation, when this is discovered. The recent advances 
in helicopters, the developments in jet propulsion and aircraft 
design, and the probable use of atomic energy as a motive force 
for aircraft propulsion lead me to believe that such a method 
will soon be devised. The medical problems associated with 
such advances will no doubt be great though not insuperable. 
The/ 
Pa6,e 103. 
The observations and conclusions contained in this thesis 
may contribute in some small way to the solution of 
such problems, and if not they may serve as a reminder 
of the part which air evacuation of casualties played in 
the Second World War. 
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